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1Introduction to CREDS
The Centre for Research in Energy Demand Solutions (CREDS) was established as part 
of the UK Research and Innovation’s Energy Programme in April 2018, with funding of 
£19.5M over 5 years. Its mission is to make the UK a leader in understanding the changes 
in energy demand needed for the transition to a secure and affordable, low carbon 
energy system. CREDS has a team of over 90 people based at 13 UK universities.
The aims of the Centre are:
• to develop and deliver internationally leading research, focusing on energy demand;
• to secure impact for UK energy demand research in businesses and policymaking; 
and
• to champion the importance of energy demand, as part of the strategy for transition to 
a secure and affordable low carbon energy system.
This report
Shifting the focus: energy demand in a net-zero carbon UK is CREDS’ first major 
publication. It builds on research undertaken by members of the CREDS consortium over 
many years to address the question “What can changes in energy demand contribute 
to the transition to a secure and affordable UK energy system that is compatible with 
net-zero carbon emissions?”. It examines the most recent comprehensive statement of 
UK Government Energy policy – the Clean Growth Strategy. Drawing on expertise in the 
CREDS consortium across the buildings, transport, industry and electricity sectors, the 
report sets out a vision for the role of energy demand changes and develops detailed 
recommendations for action.

3Shifting the focus: energy demand in a  
net-zero carbon UK
Foreword by Chris Stark, Chief Executive, Committee on Climate Change
Delivering net-zero greenhouse gas emissions depends critically on changing energy 
systems. Every analysis, globally and in the UK, shows that there will need to be rapid 
and extensive change to energy supply and energy demand. The UK has achieved major 
changes in complex systems before, but not at the scale that the Committee on Climate 
Change has now recommended to reach net-zero in the UK. 
For most people, their main interaction with the energy system is through using energy, 
at home, at work and in transport. We’ve become accustomed to these interactions 
being simple – rarely something that we consider actively – even as the UK has achieved 
substantial reductions in emissions from electricity supply. As we look forward to a zero 
carbon future, the technologies that manage and consume energy will change, affecting 
people’s experience and even their behaviour. This makes changing energy demand a 
controversial topic, but an important one. Consumers must become more engaged in 
the next stage of the energy transition. 
Public support for changing the way energy is used is essential. Reducing energy 
demand saves money for households and businesses, of course, as well as reducing 
emissions. And importantly, it can have other benefits – improving air quality, improving 
our homes and public spaces, and creating employment across the UK. 
Over the last 15 years, reduction in demand for energy has been an important 
contributor to lowering UK carbon emissions. However, in recent years, the downward 
trend in demand has begun to falter, largely due to weakening of Government policy. 
Our analysis at the Committee on Climate Change is that stronger policy to reduce 
demand is urgently needed. And we know that the policies that might influence energy 
demand are very different to those for supply – policies that are often made outside of 
Westminster, making this a fascinating public policy challenge overall. 
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4I therefore welcome this report from the Centre for Research into Energy Demand 
Solutions (CREDS). As a major research consortium focusing on energy demand, CREDS 
brings together many researchers who have individually contributed to the work of the 
Committee over several years. We look forward to working closely with them over the 
coming years to better understand the challenges of changing energy demand.
The report draws on CREDS researchers’ expertise. It sets out the key changes in energy 
demand that can contribute to carbon emissions reduction and the other energy policy 
challenges of the UK. Taking the Government’s Clean Growth Strategy as its starting 
point, it highlights where more specific policies are needed to deliver the Government’s 
ambitions and where ambitions can be increased. It is a welcome contribution to the net-
zero debate.
Chris Stark
Chief Executive, Committee on Climate Change
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6Summary of recommendations
Summary of recommendations
The complexity of energy demand means there is no ‘silver bullet’ solution or policy: a 
range of policy instruments is required to meet energy policy goals. These involve many 
sectors, institutions and stakeholders, with a range of different timescales for action. 
We list a large number of recommendations in this report, and bring them together in 
Chapter 9. They can be considered under the following six broad headings.
1. Prioritise energy demand solutions
Energy demand change can support all the key goals of energy policy – security, 
affordability and sustainability – with more synergies and fewer trade-offs than supply-
side solutions. For this reason, treating demand reduction as ‘the first fuel’ is already 
the policy of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the European Union. Demand-
side solutions also form a key part of implementing zero carbon sustainable supply, 
through using zero carbon fuels and enabling greater use of variable renewables. In 
UK energy policy, there has been a tendency to focus on energy supply options rather 
than a systemic approach. We recommend that this is reversed, and that demand-side 
solutions are given at least equal weight. 
2. Consider and promote all the benefits of demand-side solutions
UK policy with respect to energy demand tends to focus on the benefits of lower carbon 
emissions and lower bills for energy users, often using the latter as an argument for 
minimal intervention. Reduced demand, improved energy efficiency, greater flexibility 
and decarbonised fuels have a much wider range of benefits, notably for health and 
employment. Addressing energy demand is generally more likely to promote sustainable 
development than increasing energy supply. As importantly, recognising all the benefits 
is more likely to motivate action. We recommend that all the benefits of demand-side 
solutions are considered in developing and promoting policy. 
7Summary of recommendations
3. Scale up policies that work
UK energy demand policy has featured numerous policy changes in the last decade. 
In some cases, such as Carbon Emissions Reduction Target, the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment and the proposed Zero Carbon Homes standard, policy instruments that 
were well-designed and effective have been modified, or much reduced in scale. This 
has significantly reduced the effectiveness of UK energy policy. We recommend greater 
consistency in demand side policymaking and, in particular, scaling up policies that have 
been shown to work.
4. Develop long term plans for demand-side innovation
There has been a tendency in policymaking to see the demand side as having the 
potential to provide quick wins, but not to have a fundamental role in the transition. 
Our analysis indicates that this is unhelpful. Energy demand reduction, flexibility and 
decarbonisation will need to play a critical role and this should be recognised in energy 
innovation policy. We recommend that Government should develop long-term plans for 
demand-side innovation.
5. Build effective institutions for delivery of demand-side solutions
Energy using activities are diverse, and therefore the policy agenda set out above 
involves influencing a wide range of stakeholders, including both specialists and 
the general public. Doing this effectively will require a major increase in activity in 
demand-side policy delivery in Government at a range of levels. This will require better 
coordination across departments, with more capacity and clearer responsibilities 
for specialist agencies, devolved governments and local government departments. 
We recommend that Government should reform the existing delivery structures and 
develop an institutional framework designed for delivering the energy transition.
6. Involve a wider range of stakeholders to build capacity across society
A transformation in the way that energy is used needs to be led by Government, but 
cannot be delivered by Government alone. There is some good practice on which 
to build, but there needs to be a concerted effort to engage, enthuse and empower 
stakeholders across business and civil society. We recommend that Government should 
develop a strategy for involving a wider range of stakeholders to build capacity across 
society. 
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1. Introduction: why energy demand is 
important to a low carbon transition
Nick Eyre (University of Oxford), Tim Foxon (University of Sussex) and Gavin Killip 
(University of Oxford)
The aims of this report
This report sets out the critical role that needs to be played by changes to energy 
demand in delivering the ambitious goals of UK energy policy – a secure and affordable, 
low carbon energy system. Our analysis draws on current knowledge from the UK 
energy demand research community. We take as our starting point the ambitious 
goals of UK Government policy set out in the Clean Growth Strategy (BEIS, 2017), the 
Government’s most recent statement on the energy transition. In particular, this report 
considers the aim to accelerate the pace of clean growth, and we seek to build on the 
comprehensive, quantitative analysis of the Strategy done by the Committee on Climate 
Change (CCC, 2018). We agree with the Strategy that major improvements in energy 
productivity in businesses, transport and homes are crucial to achieving this goal. We set 
out a broad vision for how this might be achieved, and show that this requires attention 
to technical, social and institutional factors that drive energy demand. We argue that 
a stronger focus on demand will be required to address the greater action implied by 
a net-zero carbon target (CCC, 2019). We set out recommendations on the changes in 
policy required to deliver the goals of the Clean Growth Strategy, in relation to energy 
use.
The key role of energy demand
Energy use has been a key driver of economic and social development, by enabling 
production and consumption of goods and services and allowing people to lead 
comfortable and enjoyable lives. The industrial revolution began in Britain in the late 
eighteenth century, by harnessing first water power and then fossil fuels to provide 
heat and power. Energy use has driven the development of modern societies, and is 
critical to most aspects of our lives in homes, businesses and transport. Figure 1 shows 
the breakdown of energy use in the UK – broadly an even split between households, 
workplaces (industry and other) and transport. Ph
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1. Introduction: why energy demand is important to a low carbon transition
Figure 1: Energy use in the UK by sector 
in 2017 (TWh). CREDS calculations based 
on BEIS (2018)
However, the widespread use of fossil fuels has also driven major environmental 
problems, which has required action to mitigate by households, industry and 
Government. Although the worst excesses of urban air pollution have been addressed 
in industrialised countries, energy related pollution remains a major cause of ill health, 
even in the UK. In addition, a range of evidence has shown that stabilising the global 
climate will require the elimination of fossil fuel use within a few decades (IPCC, 2014, 
2018). The UK has led the world in adopting a strategic approach to doing this through 
the 2008 Climate Change Act. This sets progressively tighter carbon budgets for national 
emissions for successive five-year periods, at least 15 years in advance. Good progress 
has been made to date, with a 43% reduction in emissions since 1990 by 2017. However, 
the Clean Growth Strategy provides a clear warning that more needs to be done: “In 
order to meet the fourth and fifth carbon budgets (covering the periods 2023–2027 and 
2028–2032) we will need to drive a significant acceleration in the pace of decarbonisation 
and in this Strategy we have set out stretching domestic policies that keep us on track 
to meet our carbon budgets” (BEIS, 2017, page 9). At the UK Government’s request, 
the Committee on Climate Change has recently concluded that even more stringent 
budgets will be needed as 2050 is approached, for the UK to reach net-zero greenhouse 
gas emissions and make its fair contribution to the goals of the Paris Agreement (CCC, 
2019).
Addressing this challenge of achieving further and faster carbon reductions will require 
both widespread deployment of clean energy sources to replace fossil fuels, and 
reducing total energy demand, whilst continuing to deliver the services that people and 
businesses need. This requires much better understanding of the role of demand-side 
solutions in mitigating climate change (Creutzig et al, 2018).
Changes to the way that energy is used are critical to the development of a secure, 
affordable and sustainable energy system. In recent decades, more than 90% of the 
progress in breaking the relationship between carbon emissions and economic growth 
globally has come from reducing the energy intensity of the economy (IPCC, 2014). 
By comparison, reducing the carbon emissions per unit of energy has, to date, been a 
relatively minor effect. Similarly, in relation to energy security, the International Energy 
Agency (IEA, 2016) showed that, in leading energy-importing countries, energy efficiency 
improvements have played a major role in reducing dependence on imported fuel.
Industry
Transport
Households
Others
279.9
656.7
466.5
238.6
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These trends have been seen strongly across northern Europe, including the UK, where 
the decoupling of energy use and economic activity has been reflected in absolute 
reductions in energy demand. Primary energy demand in the UK has fallen by 20% since 
2003. This has confounded official projections made at the beginning of this period, 
which projected slow but steady energy demand growth (McDowall et al, 2014). This 
decoupling has a longer history, with an annual improvement of the GDP/energy ratio 
averaging 2.5% since 1970, reducing current energy demand to one third of what it would 
have been with no improvement.
These changes in energy demand have been driven by a combination of three factors:
• economic restructuring (away from energy intensive manufacturing and towards 
services)
• technical energy efficiency improvements, and
• a slowing in the growth of demand for many of the services provided by energy.
To some extent, the first of these factors is linked to the movement of manufacturing 
activity out of the UK, in particular to East Asia. This offshoring of economic activity has 
reduced UK industrial energy demand; its effect has been broadly similar in scale to that 
of technical improvements in industrial energy efficiency (Hardt et al, 2018). The Clean 
Growth Strategy aims to halt this trend of offshoring by retaining industrial activity in the 
UK. This implies that further reductions in industrial energy demand would need to come 
from technical or process changes that reduce energy demand per unit of material 
produced, or wider structural changes that reduce the demand for these materials, for 
example, through a greater focus on resource efficiency.
It is difficult to exaggerate the impact of the historical decoupling of energy demand 
from economic activity. It has contributed more to carbon emissions reduction than the 
combined effects of the UK’s programmes in nuclear, renewable and gas-fired power 
generation. It has made energy services more affordable to households and businesses. 
It has improved UK energy security, both by reducing energy imports and enabling peak 
electricity demand to be met with less generation capacity. Much of this impact has 
been driven by public policy. It is recognition of this effect across the world that has led 
to the International Energy Agency (IEA) to call for energy efficiency to be treated as ‘the 
first fuel’ in energy policy (IEA, 2016). 
Given this important role of energy demand, it features surprisingly little in public 
discourse about energy. The importance of demand is recognised in the Clean Growth 
Strategy, but the UK Government has not published an updated Energy Efficiency 
Strategy since 2013. Despite the evidence, many people still think that energy demand 
is inexorably rising and references to ‘increasing energy demand’ remain common in the 
mass media. This misapprehension applies even in parts of the energy sector, including, 
in one case, a serving Government Energy Minister (Carrington, 2015). 
12
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Another frequent misunderstanding is that energy efficiency is a short-term issue and 
that its potential for improvement will soon be exhausted. Historical evidence (NAS, 2010) 
is that the potential for cost effective efficiency improvement has remained relatively 
stable over 40 years. As efficient technology has been deployed, technological and 
organisational innovation has enabled new potential to be developed at broadly similar 
rates. Some options that are now widely used, such as LED lighting, represent a step-
change in efficiency improvement, but were not even considered in analyses done 20 
years ago. Energy using technologies and practices are still very far from their theoretical 
optimum (Cullen & Allwood, 2010). Moreover, as we discuss below, future energy supply-
side changes will increase opportunities for improvement.
The Clean Growth Strategy provides a major opportunity to implement approaches to 
energy efficiency improvement that have already been shown to be effective, either in 
the UK or elsewhere in the world. This will involve a substantial shift in UK Government 
policy, which has become less effective in recent years (e.g. Rosenow & Eyre, 2016). 
Energy demand in the UK energy transition
Delivering a secure, affordable and sustainable energy system, and particularly the 
goals of the Paris Agreement, requires an energy transition on the scale, for example, of 
the industrial revolution. Energy transitions are often described in terms of the change 
in dominant fuel (e.g. wood to coal, coal to oil), but this is a shorthand. Transitions have 
always been associated with major shifts in energy-using activities and therefore with 
wider patterns of economic development and social change (Foxon, 2017). There is 
no reason to think that the sustainable energy transition will be any different; it will not 
simply be a shift from unsustainable fuels to renewables, but also a change in how, when 
and where those fuels are used and what human activities they enable and support. 
Policy to promote the transition will need to take this into account.
Thus, the energy transition cannot be properly conceptualised without reference to 
questions about what energy is used for. People and businesses demand energy 
services (e.g. thermal comfort, mobility and industrial materials) rather than energy per 
se. Total energy demand is a function of this demand for energy services, as well as the 
efficiency with which that energy is used. The amount of energy needed to meet the 
demand for any given service therefore depends not only on the technologies used, but 
also on the wider social systems involved, including the user practices, business models, 
institutions and infrastructure associated with that service (Foxon, 2011). 
This is why understanding energy demand is critical. But it is also complex. Active 
measures to change the demand for energy services can be controversial. In particular, 
in international climate negotiations ‘demand reduction’ can be interpreted to mean 
reducing the demand for basic services and therefore ‘pulling up the ladder’ on social 
development for developing countries. Similar issues apply to people living in fuel 
poverty in the UK. However, in advanced economies like the UK, improving human 
welfare no longer relies on massive expansion of energy intensive activities. 
13
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Not all consumption is useful: car dependence, unhealthy diets, over-heating and 
over-cooling of buildings; and use of new, rather than recycled materials, are obvious 
examples. So reducing the demand for energy services is a part of the agenda for 
change. 
Achieving more significant energy demand reduction needs a focus on both efficiency 
and service demand. It is estimated that improvements in energy productivity, i.e. 
economic output per unit of energy used, of at least 3% per annum are needed to help 
achieve global carbon targets (ETC, 2017) by decoupling energy demand from economic 
output.
However, in the context of the energy transition, reducing demand is no longer the only 
issue. As the Clean Growth Strategy acknowledges, there are at least two other demand-
side issues which need to be addressed – demand flexibility and decarbonisation of 
energy sources used at the point of demand.
Variable (intermittent) sources of electricity, such as wind and solar, will play the key role 
in decarbonising the electricity system, in the UK and globally. This will make balancing 
electricity supply and demand increasingly challenging. Integrating increasing levels 
of variable renewable energy focuses attention on temporal issues. A zero carbon 
electricity system will only be possible if demand is more flexible. Technologies and 
services for demand-side flexibility will be major growth areas in electricity markets. 
Demand response (shifting the timing of energy demand) will be important. The 
Clean Growth Strategy recognises the potential benefits and the role of a smart grid 
in delivering them. It focuses largely on opportunities based on energy storage, and 
therefore somewhat underplays the potential role of increasing the temporal flexibility in 
the demand for energy services.
Most analysis of the energy transition shows that electricity will be a key form of energy 
supply for heating and transport uses, as well as for power. But there is increasing 
recognition that it is unlikely to be a complete solution, as some categories of end use, 
notably industrial processes, freight transport and space heating, are difficult to electrify. 
In these sectors, other approaches to decarbonisation will be needed using other energy 
vectors. The best combination of options is not yet clear, and therefore there currently 
is no convincing storyline for complete decarbonisation. This implies development of 
solutions that deploy other zero carbon energy vectors and associated storage, notably 
hydrogen.
These multiple aims for demand change in the energy transition – efficiency, reduction, 
flexibility and a switch to sustainable fuels – cannot effectively be analysed separately. 
A sustainable, affordable and secure energy system will require all of them. Figure 2 
sets out a simple representation of how we see them contributing to energy system 
transformation.
14
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Figure 2. Contributions of the demand side to energy sustainability.
Thinking systemically about the role of energy demand
In the context of this complexity, a systems approach is useful in understanding the role 
of energy demand in a transition to a sustainable low carbon society. Insights from past 
energy transitions suggest that systemic change involves not only new forms of energy 
supply, but also changes in the way that energy is used. In this report, we discuss in more 
detail the types of change needed in buildings, industrial processes and transport.
In contrast to micro-economic and behavioural approaches that focus on individual 
responses to incentives, a systems approach focuses on interactions between individual 
and societal choices and wider systems that both enable and constrain those choices. 
For example, energy use in a car-dominated system of personal transport depends not 
only on the technological features of the car, but also on occupancy of vehicles, the 
choice between car use and other modes and the need to travel (which is influenced by 
factors such as commuting distance and virtual communications options). In turn, these 
features and choices depend on wider systemic features, such as car and fuel supply 
networks, road infrastructures and traffic systems, patterns of land use, institutions and 
regulations governing car use, engineering skills and knowledge, political power of 
relevant interest groups, routine practices of users, and wider cultural norms associated 
with car use and other forms of transport (Geels et al, 2012). Changes to these systemic 
elements combine to create significant changes in energy demand needed to meet 
mobility or other service requirements. 
Sustainable
energy supply
to use 
sustainable energy
to reduce demand
to enable 
renewable energy
Flex energy demand in time
Switch fuels
Improve energy eﬃciency
Change energy-using activities
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None of this implies that user decisions do not matter, indeed the recent analysis of the 
Committee on Climate Change shows that changing technology alone is insufficient for 
most of the carbon emissions reduction required to reach a net-zero target (CCC, 2019). 
A systems approach argues that individual choices cannot be considered separately 
from the socio-technical system in which they are embedded (Schot et al, 2016). For 
example, choices as to whether to make a journey by private car, public transport 
or by cycling or walking depend on the availability, cost, convenience and safety of 
different alternatives. While it will require considerable change for socially ‘normal’ 
activities to be different in future, there are plenty of precedents (e.g. smoking in public 
buildings). Thinking systemically about energy supply and demand together points to 
new opportunities for interventions to achieve the goals of a low carbon, secure and 
affordable energy system. This report highlights some of these opportunities in relation 
to meeting demands for energy services in the built environment, industrial processes, 
mobility and electricity systems.
Innovation
Socio-technical systems thinking also applies to innovation. It is not only about new 
technology, but also about the context of broader economic and social change. 
Innovations are only successful to the extent they are consistent with that broader 
change. The Clean Growth Strategy rightly emphasises the importance of investment 
in innovation, including to develop new technologies and bring down the costs of 
clean technologies. Energy innovation often focuses on supply technologies, but there 
are also major opportunities for innovation to deliver energy and resource efficiency 
improvements, in industry, buildings and transport, as well as to deploy low carbon end-
use technologies.
However, we argue that this needs to be embedded in a wider understanding of the 
drivers of energy demand and the potential for changes in demand. Much research 
in recent years has argued for the need to think systemically about innovation and 
transitions, and that this can inform the difficult policy choices relating to demand 
reduction, flexibility and decarbonisation. If the goal of innovation is reframed from 
technological change to how those service demands can be met in a more sustainable 
way, we need to consider not only innovation in technologies, but also innovation in how 
energy is used, the business models for providing energy services and the institutional 
and regulatory frameworks that govern these systems. 
Changes in energy use interact with wider social and technological changes, not least 
those associated with new technological and business opportunities created by smart 
systems and the digital economy. The increasing deployment of information and 
communication technologies (ICT) could enable economic value to be delivered in less 
energy intensive ways, but could also lead to the creation of new service demands (such 
as on-demand entertainment) that increase energy demand. Greater use of ICT linked 
to more distributed forms of energy generation could open up new market structures, 
such as via peer-to-peer energy trading, but this could create challenges for existing 
regulatory frameworks. 
16
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Recent research shows that ICT has large energy savings potential, but that realising this 
potential is highly dependent on deployment details, user behaviour and indirect effects 
that could either offset or amplify direct energy savings (Horner et al, 2016). 
Implications for policy
It is well-established that demand reduction can support all three pillars of energy 
policy objectives – security, affordability and reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. 
Improving energy efficiency can play a major role in the goals for productivity, 
competitiveness and employment that are set out in the Clean Growth Strategy. Indeed, 
our analysis is that the goals of the Strategy are unachievable without a significant 
refocusing of policy effort towards energy demand. 
Energy demand involves many actors – from households to major corporations and 
Government; it occurs where we work and where we live, it underpins the goods 
and services we purchase, the ways we travel and the public services we rely on. So 
addressing energy demand effectively will involve many technologies and stakeholders. 
Therefore we endorse the analysis of the Clean Growth Strategy (p59) that the move to 
a low carbon society needs to be a “shared endeavour between Government, business, 
civil society and the British people”.
Framing the challenge of changing energy demand in this way points to a move away 
from individualist and incremental policy approaches towards an approach more 
focused on long-term systemic change. This implies recognising that policy also needs 
to consider changes in infrastructures, institutions and practices, as well as the traditional 
instruments of energy efficiency policy such as price incentives, product regulations 
and information programmes. There are also multiple potential benefits from a greater 
focus on demand in areas not usually considered in energy policy (IPCC, 2018), for 
example in cleaner air, more comfortable buildings, less waste and more liveable urban 
environments.
Government has a critical and unique role in setting the vision for this shared endeavour. 
The Climate Change Act and proposals to increase the stringency of targets to ‘net-
zero’ provide a good starting point. The commitment of Government, supported by an 
overwhelming majority in Parliament, sets the framework for the more detailed policy 
development by Government, but also provides the foundation for action by other actors 
– for corporate planning, and for the wider public discourse on energy systems and 
personal commitments. 
Policy analysis traditionally relies heavily on cost benefit analysis. In energy, there are 
good reasons for this, as the energy system is a major, capital intensive infrastructure, 
with significant cost implications for households, businesses and Government. Limiting 
the costs of delivering any desired outcome obviously matters. However, many of 
the benefits of demand reduction (e.g. health) are uncertain and difficult to value, and 
therefore often excluded from analyses. Moreover, aggregate costs and benefits are not 
the only issue for two reasons. 
17
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First, the distribution of those costs also matters, both because it is an important 
outcome in its own right, and because perceptions of fairness constrain political 
feasibility. Secondly, as set out above, changes to energy service demands drive the 
energy system. These are determined by infrastructures, institutions, preferences and 
practices that lie outside the usual scope of incremental cost benefit analyses. A more 
pluralistic approach is required to these challenges. 
This report aims to contribute to that approach. The CREDS team looks forward to 
working further with a wide range of stakeholders to examine how the ideas proposed 
in this report could be implemented, in order to contribute to the achievement of a 
sustainable net-zero energy transition.
Report structure
The following sections of the report set out our analysis, based on research evidence, 
of some key energy demand issues. These are structured along the lines of the major 
sections of the Clean Growth Strategy in which energy demand plays an important role, 
as follows:
• Section 2 considers how we might reduce and decarbonise energy demand in 
buildings;
• Section 3 looks at decarbonising industrial processes and using material resources 
more efficiently;
• Section 4 covers travel demand and low carbon transport;
• Section 5 addresses the role of shifting demand as time-of-use becomes more 
important because of increasing generation from variable renewable sources;
• Section 6 looks at the challenges associated with demand for, and use of, zero 
carbon fuels;
• Section 7 considers the governance and policy approaches that may be required; and
• Section 8 draws together our conclusions.
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Peter Mallaburn, Tadj Oreszczyn, Cliff Elwell, Ian Hamilton, Gesche Heubner and Robert 
Lowe (University College London)
This chapter sets out the trends and drivers of energy demand in buildings. It also sets 
out the policy for buildings in the UK and recommendations for government policy and 
CREDS work.
Energy demand trends and drivers
Buildings are central to our lives because they provide us with shelter and comfort at 
home, enable us to carry out productive activities at work and to provide other services, 
such as warehousing. Heating, cooling, lighting and appliances dominate the use of 
energy in both domestic and non-domestic (commercial and public) buildings.
There are 27 million dwellings and 2 million non-domestic (industrial, commercial and 
public) buildings in the UK. Together they are responsible for around 698 TWh or 43% 
of total delivered UK energy of 1642 TWh1 (BEIS, 2018a), and 29% of UK CO2 emissions 
(Committee on Climate Change, 2018).
Energy demand trends for buildings come with several caveats. The weather, in 
particular external temperature, influences demand, but adjustments to official numbers 
to take account of this can be hard to interpret. There are also gaps in the official record, 
and variations in how buildings are categorised, particularly for non-domestic buildings, 
which can appear as industry, service or ‘other’. Also, some energy vectors like electricity 
are not disaggregated by sector. Disaggregating industrial process use from building use 
is challenging in some non-domestic sectors. Most importantly drivers of demand such 
as floor area and heating demand and efficiency have not been consistently monitored 
and are instead modelled with many assumptions. 
However, with these caveats, a number of trends in delivered energy can be identified 
for both domestic and non-domestic buildings.
1 Original data units (mtoe) have been converted to TWh.
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Trends and drivers in domestic buildings
Overall, non-temperature corrected domestic energy consumption was 466.4 TWh 
in 2017, 8.8% higher than in 1970. Demand reached a peak of 573.4 TWh in 2004 and 
has since fallen by around 19%. Natural gas and electricity dominate domestic energy 
consumption with 64% and 23% respectively, with the remainder coming from solid fuels, 
biomass, petroleum and external sources of heat.
Gas consumption rose by 280% from 1970, to a peak of 396.6 TWh in 2004 before falling 
by 25%. Gas is used for heating (76%), hot water (23%) and cooking (1%).
Electricity consumption rose by 60% from 1970, peaking at 125.6 TWh in 2005 and then 
reducing steadily by 12%. Electricity is used mainly for appliances (59%), heating (17%) and 
lighting (13%).
Figure 3: Final domestic energy consumption by fuel. Source: Energy Consumption in the UK, BEIS 2018.
The main factors increasing demand are the number of households (up by 50% from 18 
million in 1970 to 28 million now), rising demand for heating and hot water (our homes are 
thought to be 4ºC warmer now than in 1970 (DECC, 2013)), reductions in fuel prices (gas 
dropping in real terms by 41%, electricity by 32%, between 1983 and 2000) and increased 
electricity use from additional lights and appliances.
The rapid market penetration of energy efficiency measures has made a significant 
contribution to the fall in demand since 2003. Condensing boilers have become the 
dominant form of heating since they became mandatory in 2005, double glazing is in 
over 80% of homes now compared to 10% in 1983 and some degree of loft insulation 
is approaching market saturation (Committee on Climate Change, 2018). However 
significant potential remains: the Committee on Climate Change estimates that around 4 
million cavity walls remain to be insulated (Committee on Climate Change, 2018).
For electricity the significant rise in the number of appliances in use has been offset by 
improvements in both operational and stand-by energy efficiency. 
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Between 2005 and 2012, gas prices more than doubled (+116%), and electricity costs 
increased by 42%. The Government considers that this, coupled with the economic 
downturn in 2008 and falling disposable income, is likely to have reduced energy 
demand over the period. However, there is no direct evidence for this.
There are some signs that the downward trend in domestic energy demand may be 
reversing, with 2016 and 2017 both showing temperature-corrected rises. However, is it 
too soon to predict any shifts in consumer behaviour.
Trends and drivers in non-domestic buildings
Overall service sector energy demand, of which around 93% comes from non-domestic 
buildings, was 238.4 TWh in 2017, which is 10% higher than 1970 (216.3 TWh) (BEIS, 
2018a). The main energy consuming processes were space heating, lighting, catering, 
chilled storage and IT, detailed below.
• Commercial buildings dominate the sector with 67% of total demand. This has risen 
by 71% since 1970 (159.3 TWh in 2017 compared with 93 TWh in 1970). The main 
categories are industrial buildings, retail, leisure and hospitality.
• Public sector buildings accounted for 28% (65.1 TWh) of demand, which is 38% 
down on 1970 (101.2 TWh). The main categories are health, and central and local 
government.
• Agriculture accounted for 7% (17.4 TWh) which is 22% lower than in 1970 (22.0 TWh).
The upward trend in overall energy demand masks three sets of influences. Commercial 
sector activity has increased significantly as the UK has moved to a service-based 
economy. This has been largely offset by a 63% drop in energy intensity across the sector 
as a whole, although this intensity trend began to reverse in 2014 and has since risen 
by 11%. The improvements in efficiency in the commercial sector are thought to be due 
to higher densities of occupation, improved heating, cooling, ventilation and lighting 
efficiencies. 
Policy principles and challenges
Policies for reducing energy demand in buildings have been well characterised in the 
academic literature, Government reports and by the work of Committee on Climate 
Change, most recently on the domestic sector (Committee on Climate Change, 2019). 
The main policy approaches are set out below.
1. Reducing demand and avoiding waste, e.g. heating fewer rooms and turning off lights 
and appliances. This is referred to as behaviour change and is a complex socio-
technical phenomena involving interaction with control systems and new emerging 
uses of energy, sometimes stimulated by efficient technologies or building design. 
2. Efficient conversion of delivered energy to useful energy by using more efficient 
heating systems, lighting and appliances. 
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3. Avoiding heat loss or heat gain by increasing fabric insulation, controlling ventilation 
and solar gains and integrating measures so that they work effectively together. 
4. Integrating energy generation into buildings, for example solar thermal, passive 
heating via glazing, solar photovoltaics, or heat pumps. Although generation is not 
strictly demand reduction, it is hard to disaggregate unless it is separately metered 
and reported. 
Buildings present many of the same barriers to change seen in other sectors. However, 
buildings, by nature and use, are highly diverse, which can make upgrading existing 
buildings difficult. As a result, policy has tended to focus on new buildings, and easier-to-
install, more cost-effective interventions on existing buildings, such as like-for-like more 
efficient boiler replacements. 
A wide variety of policy measures has been employed to do this: standards for building 
fabric and services e.g. Part L of the 2010 Building Regulations in England; performance 
standards for other technology used in the building (e.g. lights and appliances); and 
financial incentives, energy management standards and training, and feed-in tariffs or 
tax breaks to accelerate the market deployment of efficient and renewable generation 
technologies.
These policies have succeeded in reducing, or at least stabilising emissions. However, 
with ‘low- hanging fruit’ such as condensing boilers reaching market saturation, policy 
now needs to address the more difficult ‘high hanging fruit’ (also known as ‘coconuts’) 
such as heat pumps and solid wall insulation. A number of policy approaches can 
be used to accelerate the deployment of these technologies where the barriers to 
deployment are lower, for example installing heat pumps off the main gas grid (Cohen & 
Bordass, 2015).
However new buildings are a very small proportion of the stock: around 0.7% pa of 
the total UK commercial floor area (Property Industry Alliance, 2017) and 0.92%pa of 
dwellings in England (MHCLG, 2019). Sixty-five per cent of the existing UK non-domestic 
stock was built before 1991 and 24% before 1940 (BEIS, 2016). As a result, policy to deliver 
in the short- to medium-term such as the 5th Carbon Budget, needs to focus on existing 
buildings. However, in doing this policymakers face three significant challenges. 
• The actual energy performance of a building can be twice as bad as predicted at 
the design stage (Cohen & Bordass, 2015). This performance gap is caused by a 
combination of poor modelling, deviations between design and build, and occupant 
behaviour (Carbon Trust, 2011). It is a problem for all buildings but is particularly well-
characterised in non-domestic buildings (Innovate UK, 2016a & 2016b).
• Rented properties suffer from the so-called ‘landlord/tenant divide’: a principal-agent 
barrier where the landlord is reluctant to invest in energy efficiency measures (and as 
a result, respond to policy interventions) when the tenant benefits from the resulting 
lower energy costs.
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• The construction sector faces significant supply-side barriers (Low Carbon Innovation 
Co-ordination Group, 2016; Zero Carbon Hub, 2014), such as fragmented supply 
chains, especially for large companies relying on outsourcing, unhelpful contractual 
conventions, poor management practice, a lack of the skills and capacity needed to 
specify and commission novel technologies and systems, and a general reluctance to 
try new approaches without prior demonstration. 
A number of international policies and programmes are attempting to overcome 
these issues, and particularly the performance gap, by regulating operational energy 
performance as well the predictive approach used by conventional building codes. 
The Australian commercial building labelling scheme NABERS (The National Australian 
Built Environment Rating System) is a good example, although similar programmes are 
operating in the US and Singapore. 
These programmes are attracting research attention because they are clearly 
transforming their markets. They appear to be doing this by raising the strategic 
important or ‘salience’ of energy savings by exploiting the value of other, non-energy 
‘multiple benefits’ such as productivity, reputation, health, comfort or amenity (Mallaburn, 
2016). However it is not yet clear how these processes work in detail or how this success 
can be replicated in a UK market or regulatory context.
Buildings policy in the UK
The UK was the first European country to introduce energy efficiency policies following 
the oil shocks in 1973 (Mallaburn & Eyre, 2016). Energy efficiency obligation policies were 
pioneered in the UK and used as a model for similar EU programmes in the late 1990s 
(Fawcett et al, 2018). However policy in recent years has stalled.
This section briefly outlines the recent history of buildings policy in the UK and the EU, 
sets out the current situation and assesses how the Clean Growth Strategy addresses 
the more serious policy gaps and shortcomings.
History
The period 2000-2010 saw a range of policies affecting buildings:
• Significant new funding for households through the Energy Saving Trust and (in 2001) 
a new Carbon Trust to support businesses and the public sector.
• An amendment to the England and Wales Building Regulations2 requiring all domestic 
boilers fitted after 1st April 2005 to be condensing.
• A gradual tightening of the energy efficiency requirements of the Building Regulations, 
particularly in the 2006 revision in England and Wales3.
2 Part L (England and Wales) has equivalents in Scotland (Part J) and Northern Ireland (Technical 
Booklets F1 and F2) – the exact dates of changes do not coincide.
3 Part L (England and Wales) evolved between 2002-2010 to make distinctions between residential / 
non-residential buildings and between new-build / existing buildings.
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• The 2007 Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC), requiring large non-energy intensive 
organisations to measure, disclose and manage their energy use. 
• The 2008 Carbon Emissions Reduction Target (CERT) significantly ramped up the 
energy efficiency obligation on energy companies to subsidise energy efficiency 
measures.
• A 2008 requirement that all new buildings would need to be zero carbon from 2016 
(households) and 2019 (commercial).
• Smart meters, and their roll-out by the Smart Meter Implementation Programme, 
established under the 2008 Energy Act.
At the EU level:
• The 2010 Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) required Energy 
Performance Certificates (EPCs) to be provided at sale or lease to benchmark 
the theoretical energy performance of most buildings and give advice on energy 
efficiency options. Display Energy Certificates (DECs) measure actual energy 
performance in non-domestic buildings and must be prominently displayed in public 
buildings over 1000m2 in floor area. 
• EU product policy regulates the energy performance of technologies not regulated 
by the EPBD, mainly lighting and appliances. The two main measures are 2017 Energy 
Labelling Framework Regulation that governs the familiar A to G product labels 
and the 2009 Ecodesign Directive that sets minimum performance requirements to 
remove poorly performing products. 
Current UK buildings policy
The UK and EU policies described above made a significant contribution to emissions 
reductions in the last 20 years, particularly in households (Committee on Climate 
Change, (2017). However, the Government’s enthusiasm for buildings policy has waned 
since 2010 with many programmes being wound down or deprived of funding. This stop-
start approach has been a characteristic of UK policy for over 40 years.
Policy for commercial buildings, which was never a UK strength, is now particularly weak, 
with a number of initiatives held back by industry lobbying or Government concerns 
about excessive burdens on business through the over-enthusiastic implementation or 
‘gold plating’ of EU Directives (DCLG, 2015).
In 2012 direct, publicly-funded support for both business and household energy 
efficiency, estimated at around £100m pa, was removed from the Energy Saving 
Trust and the Carbon Trust (DECC, 2011). Conversely, support for public sector 
energy efficiency funding through Salix Finance has been maintained and, in 2017/18, 
significantly increased.
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In 2013 the CERT energy efficiency obligation was replaced by the Energy Company 
Obligation (ECO) which stopped subsidies for better-off households and instead focused 
on the fuel poor.
In the ‘able-to-pay’ sector, CERT funding was replaced with the Green Deal, a repayable 
loan-based system aimed at overcoming up-front capital investment barriers. It was 
originally intended for both households and businesses, although most activity centred 
on the domestic sector. 
The introduction of the Green Deal was widely recognised as a disaster both in emission 
reduction terms and, in combination with the removal of previous subsidies, by severely 
disrupting the retrofit market (Rosenow & Eyre, 2016). As Figure 4 shows, cavity wall and 
loft insulation rates have fallen dramatically compared to pre-Green Deal levels. 
Figure 4. Annual insulation rates 2008-2017. Source: Reducing UK emissions. 2018 Progress Report to 
Parliament (Committee on Climate Change, 2018). 
Zero carbon targets for both domestic and non-domestic buildings were abolished 
in 2015. The CRC Energy Efficiency scheme was fiercely resisted by businesses, 
progressively reduced in ambition and abolished in April 2019. Enhanced Capital 
Allowances for energy efficiency equipment will be abolished in April 2020 and the 
savings used to support a new industrial energy transformation fund for energy intensive 
companies.
Some new policies have been announced or enacted. For new buildings, in May 2018 the 
Prime Minister announced a ‘Buildings Mission’ to reduce energy use by 50% by 2030 
(BEIS, 2018d). In the 2019 Spring Statement (HMT, 2019) the Chancellor announced a 
new Future Homes Standard which from 2025 effectively bans fossil fuel heating in new 
homes.
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For existing buildings, the UK is developing its own operational energy performance 
scheme. From April 2019 all rented buildings are subject to minimum energy efficiency 
standards (MEES) under the Energy Efficiency (Private Rented Property) (England and 
Wales) Regulations 20154. Rented properties must have an EPC rating of E or better 
unless the landlord registers an exemption. However, as discussed in the next section, 
the value of the EPC as a policy tool is open to question.
The grant regime under the Low Carbon Building Programme was replaced by feed-in 
tariffs under the Renewable Heat Incentive in 2011 where businesses and householders 
were paid according to the renewable energy they exported to the grid.
Several voluntary schemes are also under development for non-domestic buildings. The 
Soft Landings programme (BSRIA, 2012), developed by BSRIA, the buildings services 
trade body, aims to build capacity in the sector by providing guidance and support. 
The Design for Performance programme (Better Buildings Partnership, 2018), run by 
the Better Buildings Partnership, is piloting energy performance labelling, based on the 
Australian NABERS experience, in several large UK building developments.
Buildings in the Clean Growth Strategy
The Clean Growth Strategy (CGS), and subsequent initiatives related to it, proposes a 
number of new initiatives specifically aimed at households and non-domestic buildings. 
Domestic buildings in the CGS
The key policy aim is to bring as many existing households as possible up to EPC band 
C by 2035 (where “practical, cost-effective and affordable”) and 2030 for fuel poor and 
privately rented homes. This is an ambitious target, but the CGS does not explain how it 
will be delivered or funded. Also, there are no targets for new homes beyond the current 
Building Regulations. And finally, there are also significant concerns about the use of 
EPCs as a policy benchmark (Jenkins et al, 2017). 
• A band C target is a blunt instrument. For hard-to-install measures such as solid wall 
insulation it may be more cost effective in the long run to upgrade to EPC band A or B 
at a relatively lower marginal cost compared with further intervention later.
• There are serious accuracy and reliability issues between different assessors, 
between different property types and within the same property type. 
• An EPC uses annual fuel cost and annual carbon emissions as the main metric of 
evaluation. However, as we decarbonise energy supply this might become a less 
useful metric for managing demand compared to other metrics such as load flexibility 
at peak times.
4 MEES applies in England and Wales only. In January 2016, the Scottish Government published a draft 
of the Assessment of Energy Performance of Non-domestic Buildings (Scotland) Regulations 2016 
which came into force on 1st September 2016.
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• There is compelling evidence that regulatory bodies are not enforcing current EPC 
rules (Environmental Industries Commission, 2018) or indeed Building Regulations 
more widely (Zero Carbon Hub, 2014). 
The Hackitt Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety (MHCLG, 2018), 
commissioned following the Grenfell fire, will significantly affect the regulatory 
environment in the UK. It is essential that this cultural change happens not only to fire 
and safety, but also energy performance. Several of the review recommendations, if 
implemented, would address the performance gap.
• A new Joint Control Authority separating enforcement from the interests of supply 
chain actors, including clients, designers and contractors.
• A stronger change control process that requires more robust record-keeping of 
changes made to plans during the construction process.
• More rigorous enforcement powers and penalties including requirements to change 
work that did not meet Building Regulations.
The use of regulations, if implemented correctly, can have significant benefits. 
Condensing boiler regulations are considered to be an exemplar. In 2003 they were 
in around 7% of UK houses. Once they were made mandatory in 2005, this rose to 
50% in 2011 and is now approaching 100%, saving 11 MT CO2e pa (Elwell et al, 2015) 
or 17% of total household gas consumption. There is potential for further savings at 
minimal cost such as managing flow temperatures and balancing heating systems. This 
latter measure can increase the efficiency of the system by 10% (Sustainable Energy 
Association, 2016).
Non-domestic buildings in the CGS
A Call for Evidence (BEIS, 2018b) estimated that the package of measures set out in 
the CGS would deliver £6bn in cost savings and 22Mt of non-traded CO2 emission 
reductions, split 45% from existing policies, 40% from buildings and the remainder from 
industrial processes and heat. This, if implemented, would make buildings the single 
biggest new policy element for delivering the 5th Carbon Budget. 
In common with domestic sector proposals the CGS is thin on actual policies to deliver 
this target. Only three are mentioned: a new energy performance reporting framework, 
an industrial energy efficiency scheme and tightening of the MEES standards. Key issues 
are deferred to future consultations: on advice for SMEs, the energy services and finance 
markets and the role of the UK Energy Savings Opportunity Scheme (ESOS) and Climate 
Change Agreements (CCAs). 
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Non-domestic buildings attract almost no specific policy attention at all: just 4 
paragraphs, compared to 11 pages for households. There is no substantive analysis of 
the nature and scale of the problem or of the specific policies and measures that might 
be needed. 
The Government’s response to the Call for Evidence on business policies, published 
in March 2019, promises a review of Part L of the Building Regulations in 2019 and 
recognises the importance of focusing on operational performance, but also promises 
further consultations. It is fair to say that the Government does not have a non-domestic 
buildings policy. 
There are some encouraging signs. The CGS recognises the central role of regulation 
coupled to demand-side drivers, building on research into corporate strategic or 
‘salience’ drivers (DECC, 2012) and the International Energy Agency’s ‘multiple benefits’ 
approach (IEA, 2014).
The Government recognises that policies to deliver their objectives must combine 
market solutions with strong Government intervention. This is important because the 
lessons from successful overseas policies (van der Heijden, 2017) show the value of a 
hybrid policy approach, where carefully managed government/industry partnerships are 
exploiting the multiple benefits of improved energy performance to transform markets 
(Mallaburn, 2018). 
Recommendations
Recommendations for Government policy
HMT, BEIS, MHCLG and devolved administrations: 
Develop an overall policy framework for the building sector that unifies the existing 
fragmented, stop-start policy approach and provides a clear signal of Government 
ambition and intent in the medium and long-term that will deliver the buildings element 
of future carbon budgets. If business is to invest in delivering this long-term strategy and 
develop new models it needs long-term Government commitment.
BEIS and MHCLG: 
Ensure that the implementation of the Hackitt Review addresses the energy efficiency 
performance gap on the evolution of and compliance with buildings standards and in the 
development of skills, standards, procedures and capacity within the building industry 
sector.
BEIS and MHCLG: 
Broaden overall policy on to the actual, real-world ‘as-built’ energy performance of 
buildings. Shifting to a performance-based culture will allow tenants and householders 
to choose energy efficient buildings and enable the market to accelerate their uptake. 
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• For households, regulatory policy needs to focus on actual rather than modelled heat 
loss from the buildings, based on the principles set out in the recent BEIS Smart Meter 
Enabled Thermal Efficiency Ratings (SMETER) project (BEIS, 2018c).
• For non-domestic buildings the Government should introduce a performance-based 
policy framework based on successful overseas experience.
BEIS: 
Introduce measures to deliver rapid, low-cost emission reductions from existing 
technologies and systems, for example using product labels to reflect the real-world, 
operational boiler efficiency based on the Government’s ‘Boiler Plus’ approach (BEIS, 
2017).
BEIS: 
Produce credible roadmaps for new and existing buildings on the deployment of 
emerging technologies such as heat pumps, district heating and solid wall insulation, 
identifying sectors to be used to reduce costs and build supply-chain capacity, for 
example heat pumps installed in properties off the gas grid.
Recommendations for CREDS and BEIS working together
Continue to develop and build national, long-term energy performance datasets. 
Policymakers and researchers need reliable, real-world, in-use energy performance 
data. Significant progress has been made in recent years by both Government and 
researchers, but many areas need urgent attention.
• For households, we need a national longitudinal survey building on existing data and 
monitoring, such as the EPSRC Smart Meter Research Lab and the MHCLG/BEIS 
English Housing Survey and its Energy Follow-Up Survey. Together these can provide 
a coherent platform to develop the national tool for domestic policy, the National 
Household Model.
• EPCs for the twenty-first century. EPCs are the main currency for delivering building 
energy efficiency and cost millions to implement. However, the implementation is poor 
in part because the latest computational, digital and data practices are not utilised. 
• For non-domestic buildings we need a national data strategy to bring together and 
rationalise the various official datasets and studies building on the work of 3DStock 
and SimStock.
Maximise the value of research and demonstration investments. UK Research & 
Innovation, Government and industry have funded several major projects such as 
the EPSRC Active Building Centre and the Energy Systems Catapult Smart Systems 
and Heat programme. It is important that maximum value is extracted from these 
investments, for example to help develop data and modelling tools.
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Deepen our understanding of how to exploit the value of the multiple benefits of energy 
efficiency. We need to understand how they enhance the salience of energy demand 
measures, how salience varies between organisations, sectors and individuals and where 
the key, practical policy ‘intervention points’ lie.
• For households we need systematic ways of capturing the value of multiple benefits 
in policy evaluations, for example based on HIDEEM modelling of the health benefits 
of energy efficiency (Hamilton et al, 2015), used for fuel poverty policy appraisal (BEIS, 
2016).
• Develop methodologies to characterise and better understand the relationships 
between the thermal performance of buildings and indoor environmental quality (IEQ 
– air quality, over-heating and noise).
• For non-domestic buildings we need to understand how energy productivity 
and other ‘multiple benefit’ policy approaches can transform the buildings and 
construction sectors by, for example, exploiting value drivers and building market 
capacity and skills.
Develop a long-term collaborative hybrid policy framework to decarbonise buildings 
based on successful experience overseas and the latest research that sets out the 
respective roles of industry and Government over a 10–15 year timescale.
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3. Industry, materials and products
John Barrett, Peter Taylor, Jonathan Norman and Jannik Giesekam (University of Leeds)
Introduction
Industry ultimately provides all the goods and services demanded by UK households, 
from major infrastructure to mobile phones. This clearly uses energy that leads to 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In fact, UK industry accounts for 16% of total final 
energy demand and 23% of the UK’s GHG emissions (BEIS, 2017a; CCC, 2018). Since 
1990, industrial GHG emissions have nearly halved, with 85% of this reduction occurring 
between 1990 and 2010. The reductions since 2010 have been more modest, with 
emissions actually increasing by 1% in 2017 (BEIS, 2017b). The reduction in emissions has 
been due to a complex mixture of structural change within UK industry, greater reliance 
on imports to meet the demand for energy intensive industrial products, changing 
demand for industrial products, and improved energy efficiency (Hardt et al, 2018; 
Hammond et al, 2012). 
Industry is a diverse and heterogeneous sector and there are numerous ways to 
describe its structure and to identify opportunities to improve energy efficiency. For 
example, Griffin et al, (2016) identify 350 different combinations of technologies and 
sectors relating to industrial energy demand. This makes it challenging both to identify 
appropriate options and to propose generic solutions. Other studies consider industry 
from a resources and materials perspective, such as steel, cement and paper for 
example (Owen et al, 2018; BEIS, 20155). When identifying mitigation options it can be 
misleading to treat industry as a single sector. Instead, it is necessary to disaggregate by 
subsector and identify current and available technologies, material and product outputs, 
trade patterns and infrastructures (Barrett et al, 2018).
5 Industrial roadmaps for a number of industrial sectors are available from: www.gov.uk/government/
publications/industrial-decarbonisation-and-energy-efficiency-roadmaps-to-2050
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Direct GHG mitigation options for industry are often grouped into four categories: 
improved energy efficiency, fuel switching, electricity decarbonisation and carbon 
capture and storage (Griffin et al, 2016). Clearly, there is role for all these options, 
however this chapter focuses on the role of energy efficiency in industry itself, plus 
broader measures to reduce energy demand from changing the mix of, and demand for, 
materials, products and services. 
We achieve this by identifying the historical trends in UK industrial energy demand 
and explaining the reasons behind them. We review the current UK Government policy 
approaches as outlined in the Clean Growth Strategy and then consider whether there 
could be a more ambitious role for both industrial energy efficiency and broader options 
for reducing energy demand such as material efficiency. Before proposing some 
recommendations to reduce industrial energy demand, we explore the level of ambition 
needed in UK industry in relation to internationally agreed climate targets. 
Recent trends in industrial energy efficiency and demand
A simple examination of historical trends in UK industrial energy demand suggests a 
major success story. While UK GDP has grown by ~70% since 1990, industrial energy 
demand has fallen by ~40% – indicating an absolute decoupling between the two (see 
Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Industrial Energy Demand and UK GDP (1990 to 2016). Source: BEIS, 2017b with industry data 
added from BEIS, 2017a.
Reductions in industrial energy use have been greater than the average for all sectors 
in the UK. One of the reasons for this is a decline in the amount of energy used per unit 
of industrial output – known as energy intensity. Sometimes this metric is used as a 
proxy for energy efficiency, but this is misleading. It is influenced by a range of factors, 
including changes in the mix of industrial sectors and industrial products. For example, a 
shift away from heavy industry and towards consumer electronics would tend to reduce 
energy intensity. Hence, reductions in industrial energy intensity are not only a result of 
improvements in the technical efficiency of industrial processes. 
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Hardt et al, (2018) estimate that between the period of 1997 to 2013 half of the reduction 
in industrial energy intensity can be attributed to improvements in technical energy 
efficiency, with the rest being due to structural change and other factors. 
Structural change, in turn, includes both changes in the mix of industrial sectors, and 
changes in the mix of domestically-produced versus imported goods and services. Since 
1990, there has been a trend towards ‘offshoring’ industrial production to other countries, 
meaning that a smaller share of the goods and materials consumed in the UK are 
produced in the country. Figure 6 demonstrates that offshoring was the most important 
factor along with energy efficiency improvements between 1997 and 2013. While the 
offshoring of industrial energy use helps meet national GHG emission targets, it fails to 
deliver a global reduction in emissions. 
Figure 6: Decomposition analysis of UK industry, 1997–2013. Source: Hardt et al, 2018.6
In the more recent period from 2007 to 2013, the growth in demand for goods and 
services from industry resulted in increased energy demand. This increase was only 
partly offset by a reduction in energy demand from improved energy efficiency over the 
same time-period. Therefore, without the reductions from domestic structural change 
and offshoring, industrial energy demand in the UK would have been marginally higher in 
2013 than in 2007. 
6  Technical energy efficiency is very difficult to separate from other factors and could include both 
technical changes in processes along with structural changes within sectors which would not be 
captured in the assessment of structural change between sectors. Therefore, the assessment of the 
contribution of technical energy efficiency is an over estimate.
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Current approaches to delivering industrial energy 
demand reduction 
The Clean Growth Strategy (CGS) sets out a range of strategies to help decarbonise 
industry, including not only energy efficiency and demand reduction but also fuel 
switching and other abatement options. On energy efficiency, it sets a high-level goal 
for improvement across business and industry of at least 20% by 2030 and outlines a 
number of strategies to deliver this. From an historical perspective, this represents a 
‘business as usual’ ambition with the level of improvements being similar to those seen in 
the past. 
The CGS analysis (BEIS, 2017b) shows that overall industrial emissions savings in the 
region of 45MtCO2 are technically possible by 2050 compared to baseline emissions 
in that year (CO2 emissions being 123MtCO2 from industry in 2015). This 37% reduction 
would be mainly achieved through carbon capture, usage and storage (CCUS) and fuel 
switching, with a very small role for energy efficiency of 5MtCO2 (4% of 2015 emissions). 
It is unclear when these reductions would be delivered and the issue of timing is 
extremely important when considering cumulative emissions, and therefore impact 
on climate. The Committee on Climate Change (CCC) however suggest that this 5Mt 
reduction relates to energy efficiency that could be achieved by 2030. However, this 5 
Mt emissions saving may not be the total contribution to GHG reduction from energy 
efficiency, since the BEIS baseline projection already incorporates some energy 
efficiency improvements – based on extrapolating past relationships between energy 
use and GDP. This makes it difficult to assess what the total contribution by 2050 from 
energy efficiency might be. However, the impression given in the CGS is that the role of 
energy efficiency is expected to be minimal compared to other options. 
The CGS and numerous other publications identify multiple economic barriers to 
achieving energy efficiency improvements such as split incentives, asymmetric 
information and high transaction costs. Therefore, it is difficult to reduce energy demand 
without some policy intervention as the business case for further improvements is 
weak, especially in the energy intensive sectors. A number of strategies are therefore 
outlined in the CGS to meet the high-level energy efficiency goal, building on the 
‘Industrial Decarbonisation and Energy Efficiency Action Plans’ (BEIS, 2017c), and the 
earlier roadmaps (BEIS and DECC, 2015). The proposed strategies include: an Industrial 
Energy Efficiency Scheme providing support for large companies to invest in energy 
efficiency; increasing the Climate Change Levy rates after 2019; improving and reforming 
the Energy Savings Opportunity Scheme (ESOS); introducing a new energy and carbon 
reporting framework for business to replace existing schemes; and dedicating £18m 
to industrial heat recovery (BEIS, 2017b). In addition, the CGS proposes a funding 
framework for R&D in industrial decarbonisation, with £162m to be invested by 2021 
(BEIS, 2017b) on a range of projects covering energy, resource and process efficiency, 
better low carbon fuels and CCUS. The Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund additionally 
has the ‘Transforming Foundation Industries Challenge’, covering glass, metals, cement, 
ceramics and chemicals. 
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However, the CGS provides little detail on the design and implementation of these 
strategies and it remains unclear how they would collectively deliver significant 
reduction in GHG emissions in line with UK and global ambitions.
Ultimately the success of these schemes will come down to the detail of their design 
and implementation, including the ability to target the most cost effective measures and 
to reduce the associated transaction costs. Learning from other countries is essential 
here. For example: Canada has introduced an industrial energy efficiency programme 
in four provinces; Denmark has established a ‘Secretariat for Energy Savings’, targeting 
industry with information-based measures providing assessment and analysis of energy 
use (IEA, 2017a; IEA, 2017b); the Netherlands has a system of ‘Long-term Agreements’ 
with industry; Germany has an energy efficiency framework, which has been highly 
effective at reducing energy intensity; and Japan has had their ‘Top Runner Programme’ 
since 1999, orientated towards the manufacturing sector (Geller et al, 2006; IEA, 2016; 
IEA, 2013; IEA, 2014).
We now consider what a successful programme could potentially deliver in relation to 
energy efficiency and whether there should be an increased level of ambition.
Energy efficiency options in industry
Energy efficiency is often seen as ‘the first fuel’, delivering cost saving as well as 
delivering environmental benefits. It is seen as highly attractive because it does not 
necessarily rely on changes to behaviour and lifestyles and allows the continuation of 
existing business models. Therefore, is the CGS right to identify such a small role for 
energy efficiency in industry to deliver GHG emission reductions?
The CGS analysis draws from a road-mapping exercise for eight sectors of UK industry 
(WSP, Parsons Brinckerhoff and DNV GL (2015)) and concludes that, under a scenario 
of incremental improvements, energy efficiency could annually contribute 5.3 Mt 
CO2 savings by 2050 (4% reduction as noted above). Under a scenario of ‘maximum 
technology’, which ignores economic and commercial considerations, and includes 
technologies currently at low technology readiness levels, this figure increases to 7.6 Mt 
CO2 (6% reduction). 
Energy efficiency saving potentials were found to be lowest in percentage terms in 
energy intensive sectors, such as iron and steel, and cement manufacture, which aligns 
with the findings of other work (Griffin et al, 2014). This is consistent with the observation 
that energy efficiency improvements within energy intensive sectors have been 
plateauing in recent years (Hammond and Norman, 2016). The high share of energy in 
overall production costs of these sectors has driven energy efficiency improvements 
for decades, and so the remaining potential may be relatively small and difficult to 
realise. For example, it is widely acknowledged that several energy intensive industrial 
processes (such as steel production) are close to what is technically feasible in relation 
to energy efficiency (Norman et al, 2016). This broadly leaves two options for these 
sectors: radically different industrial processes as envisaged by the CGS and/or changes 
in demand for their products. 
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Options such as CCUS have yet to become economically viable and are unlikely to be 
implemented at scale in the short term. Rapid reductions in cumulative emissions to 
meet internationally agreed climate targets require changes in the next decade. 
Conversely, the non-energy intensive sectors, having historically not had such strong 
drivers to improve efficiency, may have relatively greater opportunities remaining (often 
referred to as ‘low-hanging fruit’). There is limited evidence of where such potential 
might lie as these non-energy intensive sectors represent a challenging area for 
analysis, with poor data availability and highly heterogeneous uses of energy (Griffin et 
al, 2016). The potential for opportunities related to ‘cross-cutting technologies’ used in 
multiple sectors of industry (such as boilers and motors) are often relied on to assess 
the emissions reduction opportunities in non-energy intensive sectors. This leads to an 
incomplete analysis of the improvement opportunities by not representing the diversity 
of energy-using processes and efficiency options. Examples of particularly complex 
sectors include food and drink, textiles, chemicals and engineering. More evidence is 
needed to ensure a thorough appreciation of the opportunity in the non-energy intensive 
sectors. 
In conclusion, the level of ambition for industrial energy efficiency identified in the CGS 
should be increased. However, it is highly unlikely that dramatic gains are going to be 
possible in the short term. The most promising area for further rapid action may be the 
non-energy intensive sectors, but they also represent a smaller proportion (~35%) of total 
energy demand. Realising major additional improvements in the energy intensive sectors 
will require significant process change and therefore capital investment, which is unlikely 
to materialise in globally competitive markets without significant Government support. 
Therefore, identifying opportunities for sustained reductions in industrial energy use 
to 2050 also requires an understanding of how to reduce demand for the most energy 
intensive materials and products, which we explore in the following section. 
Going beyond energy efficiency to reduce industrial 
energy demand
All energy demand in industry ultimately relates to goods and services provided for 
households and government. With limited options available to reduce energy demand 
through efficiency improvements, changing demand for the goods and services 
produced by industry offers further mitigation options. Energy is embodied in products 
as raw materials (e.g. minerals) are processed into useful materials (e.g. glass and metals) 
and manufactured into products (e.g. buildings, cars and electronics) which in turn are 
used as inputs to all intermediate sectors (e.g. agriculture, construction, transport and 
financial services) or sold to final consumers (e.g. households and government) (Scott et 
al, 2018). As ‘carriers’ of industrial energy, the trade of materials and products results in 
the transfer of embodied energy between sectors, countries and consumers (Scott et al, 
2018). Figure 7 shows how UK and international energy supply flows (through materials) 
from the energy system, to industry and to final consumers of products in the UK, 
commonly defined as the UK’s consumption-based GHG accounts7.
7 Latest data for the UK is available from: www.gov.uk/government/statistics/uks-carbon-footprint
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Figure 7: Embodied energy analysis of the UK, extracted from data in Scott et al, 2018. Source: All data 
from University of Leeds.
The left of the figure shows the energy demand of the UK (2340 TWh) for five sectors. 
The UK imports a further 990 TWh of embodied energy in materials that are imported 
either into industry (intermediate demand) or as final product to consumers (household 
demand). It also exports 630 TWh, making the UK a net importer of embodied energy. 
On the far right of figure 7 is the energy embodied in household services such as shelter, 
mobility and nutrition. 
The value of this analysis is the ability to identify additional mitigation options beyond 
energy efficiency. These could be broadly described as ‘Putting Less In’ (production 
changes) and ‘Getting More Out’ (consumption changes) to change our use of materials 
and products that ultimately reduces the need for industrial energy. Production changes 
could include reducing waste in industry, lightweighting products and packaging, 
fabrication yield improvements, modular design or remanufacturing. Consumption 
changes could include household reductions in waste, shifts from recycling to 
refurbishing, using products longer, accessing services as opposed to ownership (car 
clubs for example) and sharing (higher occupancy rates in vehicles and buildings). 
Indirectly, all these changes have the potential to reduce industrial energy demand. 
Scott et al, (2019) calculated the potential for material efficiency across seven sectors 
(see table 1), considering measures that include waste reduction, lightweighting of 
products, material substitution and product longevity. 
Imports
990 TWh
UK Production 
Energy
2340 TWh
UK Supply Chain 
Energy
2800 TWh
Exports
630 TWh
Shelter
780 TWh
Mobility 
690 TWh
Nutrition 
200 TWh
Household Products 
280 TWh
Recreation & Communication 
110 TWh
Insurance 
80 TWh
Government & Capital 
560 TWh
UK Consumption 
Energy
2700 TWh
Domestic Heat & Travel
Industry
Transport
Services
Electricity
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Table 1: Summary of material productivity strategies. Source: Scott et al, 2019.
Sector Putting less in (production) Getting more out (consumption)
Clothing & 
textiles
Reduce supply chain waste through 
efficiency improvements in fibre and 
yarn production, dyeing and finishing
Dispose of less and reuse more
Dispose of less and recycle more
Use for longer 
Food & drink Reduce avoidable food waste in food 
services and hospitality sectors
Reduce avoidable household food 
waste
Packaging Reduce weight of packaging (metal, 
plastic, paper, glass)
Waste prevention
n/a
Vehicles Reduce steel, aluminium and additional 
weight without material or alloy 
changes
Yield improvement (metals) in car 
structures through cutting techniques
Steel fabrication yield improvement
Reuse discarded steel products
Shift from recycling to refurbishing
Car clubs
Use cars longer
Electronics, 
appliances & 
machinery
Reduce steel without material or alloy 
changes
Steel fabrication yield improvement
Reuse discarded steel products in 
industrial equipment
Sharing less frequent electrical 
appliances (e.g. vacuum cleaners), 
power tools and leisure equipment
Use for longer
Remanufacturing instead of throwing 
away
Construction Design optimization to reduce material 
inputs
Material substitution
Material reuse
n/a
Furniture Reduce steel without material or alloy 
changes
Dispose of less and reuse more
Dispose of less and recycle more
Collectively, these options offer a greater potential for emission reduction by reducing 
energy demand than all the current planned reductions in industry documented in 
the Clean Growth Strategy related to energy efficiency in industry (5 Mt CO2 in 2030). 
These material efficiency options offer potential savings of 21 Mt CO2 in 2030. The 
material efficiency measures documented in Scott et al (2019) represent a conservative 
assessment of the potential for emission reduction and are by no means the maximum 
potential. They rely on evidence from existing case studies and therefore once the 
UK started on a path towards material productivity further options are highly likely to 
emerge. 
One of the key advantages of material efficiency strategies relates to timing. The 
reality of climate change is that it is the total cumulative GHG emissions that relate to 
temperature rises, meaning that reductions in the short term offer significantly more 
investigation potential, especially if the changes create a long-term change. Many of the 
material efficiency strategies listed above require no major breakthrough in technology 
and limited capital investment but do need Government intervention to ensure that they 
materialise.
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The other advantage of these measures is that GHG emissions are not just reduced 
within the UK but would reduce emissions in other countries. The UK is a large importer 
of energy intensive materials and many of the strategies would reduce the UK’s reliance 
on imports. While the analysis above only lists the emissions savings that would occur 
in the UK, other studies suggest that a similar, if not greater reduction, would occur in 
other countries as a result of UK action (Barrett et al, 2013). This reinforces the notion that 
the UK could become a global leader in tackling climate change while also reducing its 
reliance on imports.
Conclusions and recommendations
Industry is often considered a hard to mitigate sector and most emissions scenarios 
allocate a larger proportion of the carbon budget by 2050 to industry because of this. 
Under such scenarios further and faster emission reductions are required in other 
sectors to allow for the additional ‘carbon space’ allocated to industry. At the same time, 
demand for industrial energy has not declined as rapidly as may appear from national 
energy data, because some of it has simply been offshored, with no benefit for global 
efforts to reduce emissions. 
The current UK Government strategy is framed around achieving an 80% reduction in 
GHG emissions by 2050 (based on 1990 levels). It is clear that this target is inconsistent 
with international efforts to reduce GHG emissions to net-zero in the 2050s, and 
therefore the UK Government is currently considering a net-zero target by 2050, in 
which case industry emissions would need to be much closer to zero than is currently 
assumed. Under this framing, choices between energy efficiency or fuel switching or 
CCUS disappear. The required framing is energy efficiency and fuel switching and CCUS 
and a comprehensive assessment of changing consumption patterns to reduce the 
needs for materials and products. With material efficiency measures potentially being 
three to four times more significant in reducing emissions than energy efficiency options, 
there is an urgent need to ensure that the Waste and Resource Strategy aligns with the 
CGS.
The good news is, collectively, these options could deliver substantial reductions 
ensuring that industry does not require a favourable allocation of future carbon budgets 
over other sectors. However, the efforts to achieve these reductions should not be 
under estimated, requiring additional policy and strong partnerships between the UK 
Government and industry. Without Government intervention they will simply not be 
realised. This requires alignment not just in climate and resource efficiency strategies 
but more broadly with economic objectives and future industrial strategy. With 
responsibilities cutting across Government departments (in particular Treasury, Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy, Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, 
and the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs), a joined-up, coherent and 
comprehensive plan is required. This plan is urgently needed to accompany the CGS, 
along with clarification of the rather vague measures currently proposed. 
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What all these schemes have in common is the need for high quality data, benchmarking 
and metrics to enable successful targeting, monitoring and measurement. At present, 
the UK lacks the data and institutional framework to deliver such a programme. Data 
on energy consumption linked to industrial processes is very poor, with economic data 
often being used to derive proxies for energy use. This makes assessments of progress 
and potentials very difficult, with non-energy intensive sectors being particularly poorly 
understood. The first step to implement an energy and material efficiency scheme 
for industry is to establish the necessary structures around data and management. 
This ensures that a transparent platform is in place for Government to engage in a 
transformative plan with UK industry to deliver a net-zero target by 2050.
In summary, our key recommendations are as follows.
• We recommend that Government increases the ambition for energy demand and 
emission reductions goals in industry (BEIS). These needs to align with internationally 
agreed targets and goals for net-zero emissions.
• We recommend that Government adopts industrial energy-use goals that include 
energy efficiency, fuel switching, process decarbonisation, CCUS and reducing 
the demand for materials and products (BEIS, Defra, Devolved Governments). 
The savings potentials to deliver stronger goals exist, but delivering them requires a 
more holistic approach, including energy efficiency and fuel switching, but also going 
further to include demand for materials and products for short-term reductions and 
transformative technologies for longer-term gains.
• We recommend that Government develops a comprehensive industrial energy 
demand policy, providing support and incentives for innovation and deployment of 
new technology and business models, including for energy efficiency and material 
efficiency by final consumers (HMT, BEIS, Defra, Devolved Governments). The scale 
and pace of change required is not going to happen by itself and therefore needs 
more policy intervention. This needs to involve Government playing an active role 
in supporting innovation and creating markets, including by ensuring that their own 
procurement patterns reflect the changes needed. 
• We recommend that Government accepts the need to address questions of 
lifestyle and behaviour change to deliver energy and material efficiency (HMT, 
BEIS, Defra, Devolved Governments). The options for energy efficiency improvement 
in the energy intensive sectors are very limited in terms of emission reductions, in the 
short term. Therefore, the UK Government needs to openly recognise that technology 
alone will not be enough and initiate a public debate on our lifestyles and their lack of 
consistency with a net-zero future.
• We recommend that Government develops a cross-Government approach to 
energy, climate, waste and industrial strategy (Defra, BEIS, Devolved Governments, 
HMT). This is needed to ensure that investment support, tax regimes and strategies 
are aligned. Energy, climate and waste policies need to be seen as integral parts of an 
economic policy that provides the right incentives to guide and support industry. 
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• We recommend that Government aims to take a leadership position internationally 
on energy intensive material supply chains (BEIS, Defra, DIT, FCO, DfID). With the 
UK being heavily reliant on imported energy intensive materials and products, the UK 
Government must work internationally to reduce the energy and associated emissions 
of international supply chains.
• We recommend that Government works with industry and the research community 
to develop and share better industrial energy and materials data (BEIS, Defra). 
Given the far-reaching nature of the changes, policies need to be evidence-based. 
Data availability and quality are currently not good enough for the level of analysis 
that is needed. Uncertainty is too high and not enough is known. An investment in 
more robust and transparent industrial energy data linking energy demand with 
key processes and infrastructure to allow more accurate benchmarking of sectors, 
materials and products is urgently required.
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4. Transport & Mobility
Jillian Anable (University of Leeds) and Phil Goodwin 
Introduction
Road transport accounted for just under three-quarters of transport energy consumption 
in the UK in 2017, with the remainder almost entirely from air travel (23%). Of the road 
component, energy use from cars accounts for more than half (60%), with most of the 
remainder coming from light duty vehicles (vans) (16%), heavy goods vehicles (HGVs) 
(17%) and buses (3%) (BEIS, 2018a – figures derived from Tables 2.01 and 2.02). Energy use 
from transport has increased by 16% since 1990 (6% since 2013) against a UK economy-
wide decrease of 4% (CCC, 2018a) and remains 98% dependent on fossil fuels. It has 
grown as a share of overall carbon emissions with no net reduction between 1990-2017 
(vis-à-vis –43% for all sectors combined) (CCC, 2018a).
The treatment of transport in the Clean Growth Strategy (CGS), as well as subsequent 
pronouncements in the Road to Zero (R2Z) (DfT, 2018a) and the Future of Aviation (DfT, 
2018e) strategies, assumes that the demand for travel will continue to grow, and seeks to 
reduce the use of fossil fuels by: 
• accelerated deployment of more efficient end-use technologies (road vehicles, trains, 
aircraft and ships); and
• changes in the dominant fuel source, predominantly from electrification and biofuels. 
The primary focus is changing the vehicle fleet from petrol and diesel, first to ultra low 
emission vehicles (ULEVs), and then to zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs)8, primarily through 
electrification. This focus is reflected in 44 actions out of the 46 listed in the R2Z Strategy 
(DfT, 2018a). 
8 ULEVs produce < 75 gCO2/km under the existing test cycle and includes pure Battery electric vehicles 
(BEVs), Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs). Zero emission vehicles emit no carbon or pollution 
from the tailpipe and include BEVs and Fuel cell vehicles. Strictly these are only zero emission when 
powered by renewable or zero emission electricity (DfT, 2018a).
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This chapter reinforces the growing consensus that the ambition in relation to fuel 
switching and vehicle efficiency could and should be strengthened. We nevertheless 
question the almost exclusive reliance upon technical improvements for two main 
reasons.
• The Department for Transport’s (DfT) own scenario forecasts (DfT, 2018b) show that 
the uptake of ULEVs is likely to put upward pressure on traffic growth by lowering 
the costs of motoring. ‘Clean’ growth involves more than attending to the carbon 
implications; it means considering the combined effects of continued car dependency 
leading to more urban sprawl, inactive lifestyles and congestion together with the 
lifecycle impacts of vehicles and batteries, charging infrastructure, and road and car 
parking capacity.
• The almost exclusive reliance on technical solutions will only be able to produce the 
necessary reductions if the DfT’s lower traffic growth futures are assumed. Evidence 
suggests a lower rate of demand for passenger mobility is credible, but this would 
require a different policy package to achieve and ‘lock in’ the new demand patterns. 
Thus, whether we assume underlying high growth trends whereby technological 
developments cannot hope to mitigate the externalities from traffic demand, or we 
assume that lower or even negative rates of growth could instead be enabled, a 
different suite of policies focused on shaping the demand for travel is required.
In its rather critical response to the DfT’s R2Z strategy, the Committee on Climate 
Change (CCC) also pointed to the dangers of relying on technical solutions, suggesting 
that policies influencing the demand for travel should have a more significant role. 
They recommended that the DfT should “set out a vision for future travel demand” 
(CCC, 2018b) and this chapter contributes to that vision9. The remainder of this Chapter 
focuses largely on road passenger transport. Issues related to low carbon fuels for heavy 
vehicles are addressed in Chapter 6. 
Uncertainties in forecasts of the volume of traffic
The context of forecasting traffic has changed fundamentally in recent years, and this 
is reflected in future scenarios which span from continual high growth (as happened up 
to the late 1980s), to low growth or even decline, as has happened since the 1990s). In 
either case, the demand for the mobility itself (i.e. the distances travelled and the travel 
modes used) will be at least as crucial to future energy demands as the fuel types and 
efficiencies of the vehicles. 
For many years, DfT forecasts of traffic volume, used as the basis for calculating 
projected energy use, comprised a long-term uninterrupted continuation of high rates of 
growth, with rather narrow sensitivity tests intended to allow for uncertainty in economic 
performance, population, and fuel costs. 
9  The early work in CREDS will focus on passenger demand, including some limited focus on aviation. 
Additional funding may be directed to heavy goods vehicles and freight. Whilst the core arguments 
expressed here will apply also to freight, aviation and shipping, the balance of the issues will differ.
47
4. Transport & Mobility
However, it became apparent that the forecasts systematically overestimated traffic 
growth (for reasons which are not entirely agreed) and since 2015 the official traffic 
forecasts have used a scenario approach with a much wider range of possible futures, 
none of which are given precedence as a ‘most likely’ official view of the future. The 2018 
scenarios, and the DfT’s estimates of their CO2 implications, are shown in Figures 8 and 9. 
Figure	8:	Vehicle	miles	forecasts	for	England	and	Wales.	Source:	DfT	(2018),	Road	Traffic	Forecasts	2018.	
Moving Britain Ahead. September 2018. Figure 25, pp 51.
Figure 9: CO2 emissions associated with the vehicle miles forecasts in England and Wales. Source: DfT 
(2018),	Road	Traffic	Forecasts	2018.	Moving	Britain	Ahead.	July	2018.	Figure	40,	pp69.
Scenarios 1 to 5 are forecasts with different assumptions about economic growth, 
population and fuel price, with Scenario 1 as a ‘reference case’ using long-standing 
assumed demand relationships. It predicts an increase in traffic volume of 35% and 
a calculated reduction in CO2 of 22%, with the share of electric cars and light goods 
vehicles (vans) growing to 25% of miles travelled by 2050. 
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Clearly a penetration of 25% electric vehicles by 2050 is not compatible with meeting 
carbon reduction commitments. Scenario 6 is an alternative reference case forecast 
based on the trend for decline in trip rates recently observed, which gives substantially 
lower demand growth, and proportionately less CO2 emissions. This is discussed further 
below. Scenario 7 is not a forecast as such, but a trajectory of what would happen if 
electric vehicles are assumed to meet nearly 100% penetration of cars and vans by 2050. 
In this case, CO2 would fall by about 80%, with most of the deficit accounted for by non-
car and van road traffic. Upstream and embodied emissions are not accounted for.
This base then allows us to consider the feasibility of relying only on technical change, 
and a starting point for considering the scope for changes in the volume and structure of 
traffic. 
Feasibility of relying on energy efficiency improvements 
and electrification
The CGS and R2Z’s aims for a reduction in CO2 emission from transport emissions 
by technology, without changing demand, do not appear to be based on a realistic 
assessment of what is practically possible. We outline two further points of potential 
failure: an inadequate treatment of targets for ULEVs, and the gap between declared 
vehicle performance and real-world results. 
Weak targets for uptake of ultra-low emission vehicles (ULEVs)
Only targets defined in terms of the penetration of ULEVs, rather than the energy 
service they provide, are used to frame UK transport policy and its carbon and energy 
implications. Moreover, these targets are themselves weak and muddled, with relevant 
Government departmental and CCC publications recommending, or working with, 
different targets (Table 1). The differences relate to the target years (mostly either 2030 
or 2050), the inclusion of cars and vans or just cars, the expression of the target in 
relation to new vehicle sales or the proportion of vehicles on the road. Only the DfT traffic 
forecasts supply a figure in terms of the proportion of vehicle miles travelled. Targets are 
further weakened by the continued confusion about which technologies are expected 
to be included in the definition of a ULEV. These differences make it challenging to 
compare ambition across reports, Government departments and over time. 
Table 1 demonstrates how policy has evolved very slowly, even on road vehicle 
technology: by allowing hybrid vehicles to be included, the 2040 target in the R2Z 
strategy is possibly even less stringent than was proposed six years earlier in the 2011 
Carbon Plan. Moreover, the official 2040 target is weak by international standards: 
Norway aims for all new car sales to be ULEVs by 2025; Scotland by 2032, and the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Austria, Slovenia, Israel, India and China aim for this by 
2030 (Committee on Climate Change, 2018a for a review of these targets). 
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Table 1: Targets and recommendations for uptake of ULEVs in England and Wales
2030 (/35) 2040 2050
HM Government, 
December 2011
All new cars and 
vans to be “near 
zero emission at the 
tailpipe”
Committee on 
Climate Change, 
November 2015 
60% of new cars/vans 
ULEV by 2030
Defra	&	DfT,	July	
2017
End the sale of all new 
conventional petrol 
and diesel cars and 
vans by 2040
HM Government/
CGS, October 2017
30% of new car sales 
will be ULEVs and 
possibly as much as 
70%
End the sale of new 
conventional petrol 
and diesel cars and 
vans by 2040
Every car and van on 
the road should be 
zero emission in 2050
DfT	RTF,	July	2018	 Approx. 35% of the car 
and van on road fleet 
(deduced from figure 
19, page 42 of DfT, 
2018)
Approx 80% of on road 
fleet and 100% of sales 
of cars and vans are 
zero emission by 2040
25% (S1) – 100% (S7) of 
miles travelled by cars 
and vans in the fleet.
DfT	/	R2Z	(July	
2018)a 
At least 50% (and up to 
70%) of new cars (and 
up to 40% of new vans) 
will be ULEVs
All new cars and vans 
will have “significant 
zero emission 
capability” and the 
majority will be 100% 
“zero emission”
“By 2050 we want 
almost every car 
and van to be zero 
emission” (not 
specified if this is sales 
or on road)
Committee on 
Climate Change, 
October 2018b 
100% of new cars/vans 
ULEV by 2035
BEIS Committee, 
Oct 2018 
100% of new cars/vans 
ULEV by 2032
a   The proportion of zero emission mileage is modelled as if these were electric vehicles (p30).
b   The CCC net-zero advice published in May 2019 kept this target but added “If possible, an earlier 
switchover (e.g. 2030) would be desirable”
 
In any case, a stated target is not seen to be a strong enough signal for all actors 
concerned 10. Instead it needs to be a ban to be supported by (potentially UK-
independent) legislation. In addition to ‘fuzzy’ targets, the R2Z contains only unspecified 
delivery mechanisms. This is especially surprising given the slower than expected 
uptake of electric vehicles thus far, especially pure battery variants which only 
comprised around 0.5% of car sales at end 2018, compared to 1.5-2% for plug-in hybrids 
(PHEVs).
10 Including by the CCC, the National Infrastructure Commission, the UK Energy Research Centre and 
others.
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Preliminary analysis by researchers involved in CREDS shows the inclusion of hybrid 
technologies could lock significant amounts of fossil fuel into the sector well beyond any 
target date11. Figure 10 shows the Internal Combustion Engine ‘ICE ban 2040’ scenario 
representing the loosest definition of ULEVs which allows both conventional hybrids 
(HEVs) and PHEV cars and vans. When compared to 1990 levels, this scenario shows 
reductions in tailpipe CO2 emissions of only 61% by 2050. When also banning new HEVs 
from 2040, the results show a 88% drop, or 93% if from 2030. This suggests that the 
trajectory for urgent CO2 savings requires phasing out all forms of conventionally fuelled 
ICE and HEV cars and vans by 2030 and that net-zero (for tailpipe emissions) may only be 
achieved by also phasing out PHEVs by this date.
Figure 10: Tailpipe CO2	reductions	by	2050	from	UK	cars	and	vans	based	on	different	combinations	
of Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) and (Plug-in) Hybrid Electric Vehicle ((P)HEV) phase-out. Source: 
Anable,	J.	&	Brand,	C.	(2018).	Consumer	behaviour:	priorities	for	progress.	Presentation	at	the	Low	
Carbon	Vehicle	Partnership	annual	conference,	June	2018.
This analysis is heavily dependent on the assumption that new car and van CO2 
emissions for all propulsion systems will undergo continuous improvement (Brand et al, 
2017) and that a generous proportion of miles undertaken in PHEVs will use the electric 
battery (largely for urban driving, i.e. approx. 40% of the total mileage with motorway and 
rural driving assumed to mostly use the ICE). This compares to 73% of PHEV driving done 
in electric mode assumed in the R2Z analysis (DfT, 2018c pp. 130)12. This is important 
because, so far, 3 out of every 4 plug-in vehicles sold in the UK has been a PHEV. In the 
summer of 2018, analysis of real-world fuel consumption data on 1,500 company owned 
PHEVs (comprising seven models) (Middleton, 2017; Hollick, 2018) found the vehicles 
only achieved an average of 45mpg or 168 gCO2/km compared to their advertised 
average consumption of 130mpg or 55 gCO2/km. 
11 Based on new approach in Brand et al, 2017. 
12 Note that in the linked report on the modelling methodology, this figure is reduced to 62%.
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The report concludes: “On the evidence of our sample, one has to question whether 
some PHEVs ever see a charging cable” and suggests PHEVs would attract the highest 
rate of company car tax if they were to be assessed on their real instead of on laboratory 
test results. 
Real-world performance
Until recently, the EU mandatory regulations for new cars would appear to be a 
resounding success for CO2 standards. The rate of reduction in official average tailpipe 
CO2 values of new passenger cars in the EU increased from roughly 1% per year to more 
than 3% per year after their introduction in 2009. However, two factors mean this success 
is not all that it appears.
Firstly, there has been no improvement in tailpipe emissions in the UK since 2015 and 
average level of CO2 emissions of new cars sold in September 2018 was 128.3 gCO2/
km, the highest recorded since July 2013. A switch away from diesel only accounts for a 
small proportion of this increase, the main culprit being the swing over the past decade 
towards larger passenger cars, particularly SUVs (dual purpose vehicles) while the rest of 
the market declines (SMMT, 2018). SUVs now account for around a quarter of car sales 
in the UK with no sign of slowing down. Somewhat shockingly, this proportion holds true 
for electric vehicles (BEVs + PHEVs) – 25% of all the 32,048 plug-in cars registered by the 
end of 2017 comprised one make and model only (Mitsubishi Outlander) – an SUV in the 
form of a PHEV and one of the most polluting cars on the road when not driven on the 
electric battery. 
Secondly, although the above figures suggest a 30% reduction in tailpipe CO2 emissions 
since 2000, these are based on test cycle measurements. In practice, there has only 
been an estimated 9% reduction in tailpipe emissions in real-world conditions, and 
only 4% since 2010. The performance gap between official and real-world values has 
grown over time, standing at 42% in 2016 (Teitge et al, 2017), although this gap has 
now stabilised. This gap has effectively negated any reported savings from efficiency 
improvements over the past decade. 
The regulatory failure of the test cycle versus real-world emissions was not mentioned 
in the CGS but was addressed in the narrative of the subsequent R2Z which frequently 
noted it would be considering “real-world” emissions. A new test procedure, the 
Worldwide Harmonized Light Vehicles Test Procedure (WLTP), is being currently being 
phased in. Whilst a step in the right direction, the WLTP is not a silver bullet and will not 
close the performance gap on its own. The discrepancy matters to how meaningful the 
regulatory or stretched targets are and thus how quickly forward projections will be met. 
Whilst it could be argued that if electricity is zero carbon this should not matter, the 
energy efficiency of the transport system is an important issue in its own right and will 
become more important as vehicles play a key part of the electricity storage solution to 
balance electricity demands on the grid. 
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Prospects for travel demand change 
Collapse of ‘business as usual’ trajectories of travel demand
The CGS generally adopts an approach of identifying a firmly established baseline 
forecast of demand, given by reasonably clear economic trends, and treating this as 
either inevitable or as a target for policy intervention only after other largely technical 
solutions have been exhausted. Yet, in the context of travel, there is now a strong 
evidence base that the trends have changed, and continue to do so. Since the early 
1990s (but only now being retrospectively understood), actual road traffic growth has 
been systematically less than forecast so that the hitherto uninterrupted growth in 
car use is no longer the dominant trend. Periodic discussion of ‘peak car’ has led into 
investigations of the evidence (Marsden et al, 2018; Chatterjee et al, 2018), which reveal 
that structural changes in travel demand due to shifts in the pattern and location of 
activities, social changes including delayed family formation, economic changes in the 
nature of retail and employment (especially youth employment), and possible impacts 
of mobile internet access, all correlate with a downward trend in overall trip rates. These 
trends are manifesting differently among different groups and in different types of built-
up area (BUA) (Figure 11). 
Figure 11: Percentage change in car driver miles per head per year by age group and area type 
(England 2002–05 to 2011–14). Source: Analysis by P. Headicar as Chart 17, pp18 in DfT (2018). Analyses 
from the National Travel Survey Statistical Release.
This shows a reduction of 20% and 10% respectively among the two younger groups, 
an increase of 12% among 60+ year olds with differences in the magnitude (but not 
direction) of these changes in different places. The outcome is that since the early 1990s, 
aside from general population growth, it is only an aging cohort of people, now over 60, 
that has contributed to traffic growth, whereas successive cohorts of younger people 
have shown a reduction in driving licence-holding, car ownership, and car use.
age 60+
age 35–59
age 17–34
Greater London BUA
Core Cities and Conurbations
Other Centres BUA >100k
Other large towns BUA >100k
Medium towns BUA 25-100k
Small Towns BUA 3-25k
Rural (BUA <3k and non BUA)
All
 –0.30  –0.20  –0.10  0  0.10  0.20
53
4. Transport & Mobility
Such findings sit alongside a very substantial body of experience and evidence 
about the effects of policy interventions intended to address a much wider range of 
policy objectives than energy use alone, including health, quality of life, commercial 
vitality, safety, and equity. These various objectives have all tended to converge on 
policy packages aimed at reducing the need to travel by better land-use planning, 
restrictions on car use in central, residential, and environmentally sensitive locations, and 
facilitating transfer of car trips to public transport, walking and cycling by reallocation of 
expenditures, street design, pricing and regulation. This allows for a policy perspective 
where reduced energy use does not run counter to quality of life but arises from 
measures designed to enhance it. Conversely, relying mainly on electrification of 
vehicles to reach carbon targets can have the consequence of increasing traffic 
congestion because of the lower cost and lower taxation of electric fuel. This is seen 
in the DfT Scenario7 above, where 100% electrification has the highest level of traffic 
growth. 
Thus, it is no longer adequate to adopt what used to be the central or most likely traffic 
forecasts produced by the DfT as the official view of future trends in demand and, from 
these, calculate the scale of technological deployment needed to mitigate the carbon 
consequences of this growth. There is a need for new approaches to demand analysis 
on how to treat the scope for such policies. Underpinning the observed changes, there 
are new theoretical understandings of the dynamic processes of travel demand, where 
changes can happen through demographics, migration, churn, habit formation and 
breaking, and interactions with land use outcomes, disruptions and social norms. In other 
words, “societal needs and demands are not given: they are negotiable, dynamic, and 
in part constituted by technologies and policies, including those of efficiency” (Shove, 
2017).
Thus, the pattern of co-benefits, empirical evidence on trend shifts and policy 
implementation, and better understanding of influences on demand, give scope for 
considerably more ambitious reductions in passenger transport energy and carbon 
use than has been assumed in the CGS, DfT and CCC publications. Moreover, evidence 
suggests a lower rate of demand for passenger mobility is a necessary and a credible 
future, but that this would require a different policy package to achieve and lock-in the 
new demand patterns, alongside new vehicle technology.
Recommendations for policy 
Travel behaviour is already changing in ways that provide opportunities to enable a 
lower growth trajectory to be deliberately locked-in. National and international examples 
of sustained lower car-dependent lifestyles indicate that this can be achieved at least 
in some localities. Such a prospect puts much greater emphasis on policies which 
influence and provide for more energy-conserving lifestyles, including: emerging 
models of car ‘usership’, changing social norms around mobility, new spatial patterns 
of population growth, the changing nature and location of work, education, housing, 
healthcare and leisure, reconfiguration of travel by digital technology, and new ways of 
paying for road use or energy (electricity).
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The Avoid-Shift-Improve (Schipper & Liliu, 1999) hierarchy has been used to emphasise 
the priority ordering and layering of our recommendations that stand apart from the 
dominant supply and vehicle technology-oriented approach to energy reduction and 
decarbonisation in the sector. The recommendations focus on surface passenger travel 
and are targeted at national and local policy makers.
Avoid travel demand and car ownership
Lock-in recently evidenced demand changes
Where specific groups have already shown flexibility in demand, there should be 
targeting to lock-in those changes, and to extend the behaviour to wider numbers. This 
can be done through policies such as car clubs, smart ticketing, investment in rail and 
in digital technology. Access to subsidised or free public transport is at present largely 
determined by age, and it is clear that behaviour patterns also show strong age effects, 
but making best use of this may justify an overall review of age boundaries both for the 
young and old. Improving the experience for these sub-groups of living without a car 
should not only improve the chances of them opting to live without one (or with fewer 
per household than they might have done) for longer, but will simultaneously improve 
non-car travel for a wider set of people and places.
Design regulatory frameworks to steer emergent innovations (e.g. On-Demand 
mobility,	autonomous	vehicles)	to	deliver	societal	benefit	and	avoid	high	travel	
lock-in in the future
Ignoring the dynamic interactions between society and technology led to the 
performance gap in real-world energy consumption of vehicles. We are in danger of 
repeating this mistake with respect to new forms of ‘on-demand’ mobility services, 
relinquishing of ownership in favour of shared assets, autonomous vehicles and the two-
way integration of vehicles and the electricity grid (see for example Wadud et al, 2016). 
To ensure these developments reduce vehicle miles travelled, a ‘preventative’ regulatory 
framework designed to enable these innovations to result in a net increase in co-benefits 
such as social inclusion and transport and energy system flexibility is needed. Specific 
interventions such as mandating the use of autonomous vehicles in shared contexts, 
public investment in car-clubs or on-demand services in rural areas and designing car 
scrappage schemes to accelerate the uptake of mobility packages as opposed to new 
vehicles, will be necessary13.
Develop a cascading framework of national and local support for car clubs
Having access to a shared vehicle has been shown to lead to reductions in personal 
car ownership and miles driven, as well as increased use of other modes of transport 
(Marsden et al, 2018). This reduction includes households giving up a car completely, 
but equally important is reducing from, say, two cars to one car. More creative support 
options can be explored at the national and local levels to ensure that more people can 
opt out of owning a car in favour of accessing shared car club services. 
13 Transport for West Midlands is trialling a Mobility Credits Scrappage Scheme from March 2019.
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These support options can take the form of both carrots (e.g. supporting interoperable 
underpinning ICT infrastructure, ‘smart’ design of car scrappage, integrating shared 
travel into multi-modal journey-planning apps, providing dedicated car parking, charging 
and signage to car club vehicles) and sticks (e.g. parking charges and restrictions in 
residential areas and workplaces for privately owned vehicles). The benefit of a nested 
approach to national and local support for car clubs is evident from Scotland, where 
there was membership growth of 29% between 2016 and 2017 (Steers Davies Gleave, 
2018). The overall aim would be to reduce the size of the passenger car fleet as well as 
accelerate its decarbonisation as vehicles are utilised more intensively and renewed 
more frequently.
Incentivise the coordination of transport and planning objectives to reduce the 
need to travel 
Enabling travel avoidance is chiefly a matter of coordination of planning and transport 
objectives in the housing type and location, density of development and location as well 
as timing of services (including workplaces, schools and healthcare). Local authorities 
receive bonuses for achieving housing targets with none of this bonus tied to the travel 
and energy efficiency of the developments. Businesses also need to be engaged 
through incentivisation of the reduction of their travel footprint, including commuting, 
perhaps linked to an expanded system of Display Energy Certificates. Similarly, there 
should be greater integration between the planning and prioritisation of investment in 
digital infrastructure and transport to support many of the above initiatives but also to 
deliberately substitute some travel by virtual access in ways that avoids further spatial 
fragmentation and net increases in demand.
Develop a zero-growth indicator
By adopting a scenario approach for car travel, the DfT analysis suggests de facto 
acceptance of a varied range of potential growth scenarios for alternative modes. Under 
this multiple scenario approach, policies need to be appraised themselves not under a 
single scenario, but under the assumptions of at least the high growth and low growth 
possibilities. This itself means that flexibility and adaptability – if (when) forecasts turn 
out to be wrong – becomes an advantage. This flexi-appraisal would be extended to 
non-transport transport policies – i.e. traffic-generating land use developments, service 
reductions in rural areas and policies leading to the centralisation of core services such 
as health and education.
From this, it is possible to imagine the development of a zero traffic or transport energy 
growth objective, or indicators based on capacity constraints on the electricity grid. 
For instance, Norway has adopted a zero-growth objective for car traffic in urban 
areas embedded in a national transport plan which introduced ‘urban environmental 
agreements’ (Norwegian National Rail Administration, 2016). This will involve 
environmental and time differentiated road tolls linked to “stronger investment in urban 
areas”.
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Incentivise local authorities to achieve a zero-growth indicator
The CGS does not address the issue of scale and location. Nevertheless, place-based 
industrial strategy is gaining traction as a key principal of innovation programmes at 
the European and UK levels. Just as we have highlighted that recent changes in travel 
demand have been unevenly distributed, the uptake of technology, including energy 
generation, will also differ. Methods of analysis, policy design and appraisal need to work 
with this geographical diversity. In particular, local authorities need to be incentivised to 
reach the zero-growth target indicator outlined above.
Shifting travel to the most sustainable modes
Systematic support for the very lowest energy modes of transport
Enabling and encouraging a shift from private motorised travel to more energy efficient 
modes requires systematic support for the very lowest energy methods of transport 
– walking, cycling (including e-bikes and e-scooters) and public transport, through 
investment programmes on both capital and revenue spending, priority use of road 
space, and an expansion of ‘soft’ or ‘smarter’ methods of encouraging behavioural 
change. The goal would be to design “a mobility system where it is more normal to 
take part in activities using the most sustainable modes more of the time” (Marsden et 
al 2016).
Institute	a	new	approach	to	prices	and	taxes	to	reflect	a	fuller	range	of	costs	and	
benefits
A new approach to transport pricing would ensure that the relative prices of different 
transport options reflect the full range of costs and benefits to the consumer, including 
health, energy, embedded emissions, congestion and other environmental impacts. 
Restructuring prices could include direct subsidy to lock-in sustainable travel choices 
by charging for use of scarce resources at a rising unit rate where more is used. Such 
pricing mechanisms would therefore expand the traditional notion of road user charging 
to reflect wider transport and energy system usage and will incorporate thinking on how 
to avoid increases in demand that may be stimulated by lower motoring costs of ULEVs.
Improving efficiency of individual modes
Improve	the	efficiency	of	vehicles	in	use,	particularly	through	increased	
occupancy
A focus on efficiency of vehicles in use is much more than eco-driving. It considers 
maximising assets in ways that substantially reduce single car occupancy and individual 
ownership. There is no detectable policy weight placed on the efficiency of vehicles in 
use, even though increasing vehicle occupancy, potentially through mobility sharing 
platforms, would ratchet down energy intensity of travel considerably. There are a 
number of potential types of initiative targeting both businesses and individuals, again 
falling into carrot (mileage fee reimbursement rates and salary sacrifice incentives) 
and stick (regulation of the ‘grey fleet’ (use of own cars on business travel), parking 
restrictions and fees) as well as a review of company carbon accounting to incorporate 
commuting travel.
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Restructure ULEV targets to include phasing out hybrid cars
As our own empirical work has highlighted, the trajectory for urgent CO2 savings requires 
phasing out all forms of conventionally fuelled ICE and HEV cars and vans by 2030 and 
that net-zero (for tailpipe emissions) may only be achieved by also phasing out PHEVs by 
this date. The current wording of targets is at best muddled, but at worst leaves the door 
open for hybrid vehicles, and subsequent locking-in of a substantial amount of fossil-
fuelled mileage during and beyond the target dates.
Regulate to reduce the availability and sales of large cars
The stagnation in average CO2 emission values of new passenger cars in the UK in recent 
years has much to do with an upsurge in purchase of larger cars. Some of this trend is 
likely to be due to people choosing to apply the savings from greater energy efficiency 
to buy more comfortable, more reliable, or more prestigious vehicles which, being larger 
and heavier, use more energy than necessary for like-for-like journeys. The implication is 
that measures of energy efficiency which reduce costs can only be fully effective if they 
are combined with other measures to prevent or offset such countervailing processes. In 
this case, regulation of sales-weighted average new car carbon emissions is failing and 
needs to be redesigned to, once again, lock-in the net benefits of this policy. This could 
potentially involve regulating to phase out the largest vehicles or restrict their use to 
genuinely appropriate circumstances. 
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5. Electricity: making demand more flexible
Jacopo Torriti and Martin Green (University of Reading)
Background
The UK Government’s Clean Growth Strategy (CGS) places significant importance 
on flexibility in electricity demand. Flexibility is important because the integration of 
intermittent renewables in the supply mix, as well as high penetration of electric vehicles 
and electric heat pumps, will challenge the balance of demand and supply. The CGS 
considers demand flexibility will need to play a vital role for a stable electricity system as 
existing approaches to balancing are inadequate. In this context, there are opportunities 
to reduce the costs of electricity if smart systems and battery storage are used to flex 
demand at times when it is high. In a nutshell, demand-side flexibility is portrayed in the 
CGS as a win-win solution, as consumers will help balance the grid in return for lower 
bills if they take advantage of smart appliances and smart tariffs. 
The key part of the CGS on demand-side flexibility is in ‘Delivering Clean, Smart, Flexible 
Power’. This points to investments from the UK Government of £265 million between 
2015 and 2021 in research, development and deployment of smart systems to reduce 
the cost of electricity storage, advance innovative demand-side response (DSR) 
technologies and develop new ways of balancing the grid. The move to low carbon 
generation will increase the variability of electricity supply, as key technologies depend 
on both weather (e.g. wind speed) and daily and annual cycles (e.g. solar radiation). 
The general view is that a more flexible system is required. Most of the principles 
underpinning the vision for demand flexibility are set out in the 2017 smart systems and 
flexibility plan (BEIS and Ofgem, 2017). The plan is based on a report that shows a system 
using DSR and distributed storage to provide flexibility would be between £17bn and 
£40bn cheaper over the period to 2050 compared to a system that relies on enhancing 
flexibility through interconnectors and pumped hydro storage (Carbon Trust & Imperial 
College, 2016).
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This chapter focuses on drawing together existing research evidence to inform an 
independent analysis of the flexible energy demand aspects of the CGS. Given the 
importance and relative novelty of flexibility at the scale envisaged in the CGS, the policy 
implications need to be thought through carefully and based on evidence. Research 
needs to ask fundamental questions around whether flexibility benefits systems as well 
as consumers. The two key aims of this chapter are: (i) to assess whether different/
additional policies and measures will be required, and (ii) to identify important research 
gaps to be filled by CREDS through co-created research. In order to deliver these two 
aims, this chapter compares the overall level of flexibility forecast in the CGS with other 
studies; presents alternative approaches to achieve flexibility; and suggests areas of 
research in this emerging field. It is concluded that moving to higher levels of demand 
flexibility will require radical shifts. This calls for more clarity at the planning stage on the 
following questions: will flexibility be achieved through technology interventions alone? 
What role do smart tariffs play at different levels of penetration? Critically, research is 
needed to assess the win-win proposition stated in the CGS, i.e. that consumers and the 
electricity grid will both benefit from the introduction of greater flexibility. 
This chapter questions how ambitious the flexibility target in the CGS is compared with 
existing studies; describes what is planned in the CGS; proposes a radically different 
Government approach on flexibility; and concludes by identifying three significant 
research gaps.
How much flexibility? An unambitious target 
The CGS presents figures on levels of flexibility for the future based on BEIS’ 2032 
pathway calculations for an 80% renewables future. Electricity demand is projected to 
increase by 3% (10 TWh), with an increase in peak demand of 4% (2.8 GW), by 2032 from 
2016 levels. The extra capacity and flexibility is proposed in the CGS to originate from 
DSR (4.9 GW), storage (0.3 GW), clean generators (0.5 GW) and fossil fuels (1.2 GW). The 
increase in peak demand is argued to arise from the uptake of electric vehicles and 
heat pumps. This allows for some implicit DSR (i.e. the effect of consumer response to 
time-dependent pricing), which would consist of shifting to overnight charging for most 
electric vehicles and smart controls of heat pumps.
This proposed increase in DSR is a relatively unambitious target. National Grid estimates 
that 2.7 GW of DSR capacity, equivalent to two large power stations, participated across 
their portfolio of balancing products and services in 2017 (National Grid, 2017). A report 
by the Association for Decentralised Energy suggests that by 2020 DSR could provide 
4.5 GW thanks to 2.8 GW from industrial demand flexibility and 1.7 GW from commercial 
and public sector demand flexibility (ADE, 2016). A report by Element Energy estimated 
that the non-domestic potential of DSR in 2011 was in the range of 1.2–4.4 GW (Element 
Energy, 2012). The scenarios prepared by the Carbon Trust and Imperial College 
suggest DSR deployment of between 4.1–11.4 GW by 2030. This variation highlights the 
opportunities, yet clear uncertainty, in the DSR potential offered by the electrical assets 
in UK businesses. 
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Figure 12 shows future levels of DSR in the UK according to different studies and reports. 
The size of the bubble represents how large forecast DSR levels are and the position of 
the bubble indicates the year to which the forecast applies. The red line represents the 
trend and, notably, the purple bubble (i.e. CGS) has the lowest ambition in terms of DSR 
penetration. 
Figure	12:	Forecast	future	levels	of	UK	Demand	Side	Response	(in	GW)	in	different	years.
The flexibility target in the CGS is not sufficiently ambitious. This is because the analysis 
underpinning the target relies heavily on the “five-day stress test”, which was designed 
only to address the challenge of balancing the electricity system during adverse winter 
weather conditions of high demand and low renewable electricity output. This approach 
to the need for flexibility and DSR is anchored in the old ‘plan and provide’ approach to 
system operation, in which flexibility is only needed to ensure adequate total capacity. 
However, in any highly renewable future, flexibility will be needed to meet a variety of 
requirements, including capacity adequacy under stress conditions, but also the ability to 
increase, decrease, or shift electricity demand frequently.
Actions planned in the CGS
The 2017 Smart System and Flexibility plan outlines 29 actions under three areas 
(removing barriers to smart technologies; smart homes and businesses; and markets 
which work for flexibility). 
With regards to market arrangements, the actions are aimed at amending issues 
preventing DSR participation, including ensuring that storage and demand flexibility 
participate on a level playing field in the Capacity Market; delivering efficient access 
for independent aggregators to the Short Term Operating Reserve (STOR); simplifying 
ancillary services and making them more transparent; changing network charges; and 
improving stakeholder engagement in flexibility. 
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Figure 13: Detailed breakdown of non-balancing mechanism. Source: National Grid, 2015.
Figure 13 provides a breakdown of the resources used by the System Operator (National 
Grid) to balance supply and demand at different times. The Balancing Mechanism (BM) 
uses price signals to incentivise generators to come on or off the network. Outside the 
BM are several other options that can be deployed quickly, for example through STOR. 
The figure shows that 237 MW (7% of overall STOR capacity) is from load reduction 
(which in this case is likely to also include load shifting DSR, as the National Grid uses the 
term ‘load response’ to cover both load shifting and ‘turn-down’) (National Grid, 2017). In 
addition, DSR contributes to the provision of adequate capacity. The turn-down DSR only 
Capacity Market auction in March 2017 resulted in Ofgem awarding 300 MW of contracts 
to DSR (Ofgem, 2017). These two MW figures cannot simply be added as each could be 
provided from the same assets. Therefore, based on the figures obtained from published 
reports and assuming additional amounts have been provided via other sources, a rough 
estimate of turn-down DSR is between 300-500 MW. This represents only 6-10% of what 
is required to meet the CGS target of 4.9 GW of DSR. A much more radical approach is 
required for flexible demand as explained in the section below. 
Changing approach completely on flexibility
The CGS and the ‘Smart systems and flexibility plan’ can be seen as the first positive 
steps towards the inclusion of demand-side flexibility in a low carbon energy system. 
However, in order to accommodate high levels of flexibility the actions they put forward 
will be insufficient. This section puts forward more radical suggestions for the integration 
of flexible demand in a low carbon future. 
BM total • 1486 MW • 43%
Non-BM total • 1958 MW • 57%
Biomass • 29 MW • 1%
CCGT • 219 MW • 6%
CHP • 105 MW • 3%
Diesel • 743 MW • 22%
Gas reciprocating engine • 102 MW • 3%
Hydro • 151 MW • 4%
Load reduction • 237 MW • 7%
OCGT • 368 MW • 11%
Bio-diesel • 4 MW • <1%
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If	flexibility	is	to	play	a	major	role,	the	rules	have	to	be	changed	entirely
There is no specific market programme for flexibility in the UK and DSR is instead 
contained within the current electricity balancing services of the Electricity System 
Operator (a company in the National Grid Group). While STOR is a means of providing 
DSR, its current structure provides a number of barriers to uptake and discourages 
investments in DSR. These market rules favour generator-based services and restrict 
turn-down solutions. Battery storage is currently charged fees for using the energy 
network as both a demand customer and a generator, i.e. both when drawing power 
from and discharging power back to the system. 
Table 1 – Review of DSR barriers
Barrier 
Category
Barrier Research Source
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
End user Lack of DSR awareness / understanding • ● ● •
Impact Concerns● • • • • •
Risk aversion / trust issues● • • •
Regulatory Regulations unfavourable for DSR • • • • • • •
Current regulations preventing DSR •
Technical Lack of ICT infrastructure • •
Cost of enablement● • • •
Equipment not suitable for DSR ● • • •
Market Lack of DSR market options • • • •
Insufficient financial incentives● • • • • •
Traditional large generation bias • • •
Source Key:
1   (Strbac, 2008) Demand Side Management: Benefits and Challenges
2   (Owen, Ward, & Pooley, 2012) What Demand Side Services Could Customers Offer?
3   (Cappers, MacDonald, Goldman, & Ma, 2013) An Assessment of Market and Policy Barriers for 
Demand Response Providing Ancillary Services in U.S. Electricity Markets
4   (Warren, 2014) A Review of Demand-Side Management Policy in the UK
5   (Nolan & O’Malley, 2015) Challenges and Barriers to Demand Response Deployment and 
Evaluation
6   (Olsthoorn, Schleich, & Klobasa, 2015) Barriers to Electricity Load Shift in Companies: A Survey-
based Exploration of the End User Perspective
7   (SEDC, 2017) Explicit Demand Response in Europe: Mapping the Markets 2017
8   (The Energyst, 2017) Demand-side Response: Shifting the Balance of Power: 2017 Report
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Box 1 – key barriers for DSR uptake: 
The research literature on DSR identifies many different types of barriers, which fit into the four main 
categories of: end user, regulatory, technical, and market (Table 1). The end use barrier focuses 
on issues that end users have direct influence over, such as lack of interest in DSR. Examples of 
regulatory barriers include the fact that several Governments do not yet acknowledge the role of 
independent DSR aggregators in enabling uptake. One of the major technical barriers is end user 
equipment being deemed as unsuitable for DSR. Market barriers consist primarily of the absence a 
specific market programme for DSR. 
 
National Grid’s estimate of the DSR contribution to overall balancing (2.7 GW in 2017) 
is probably an overestimate as it includes smaller scale diesel generation, which is 
not truly DSR as diesel generators are not associated with an energy user; rather, they 
are dedicated supply-side assets as illustrated in Figure 13. Considering only user-led 
demand management and on-site generation participating in the Balancing Services, 
the amount of DSR used for balancing the system in 2017 was approximately 700 MW. 
Changing the rules entirely might involve, for instance, the development of a flexibility 
market which can place a higher value on more flexible resources (DECC, 2013).
The	capacity	market	is	an	ineffective	instrument	to	provide	flexibility
The UK’s Electricity Market Reform policy aims to deliver low carbon energy and reliable 
supplies. A key mechanism this uses is the creation of a Capacity Market that “provides a 
regular retainer payment to reliable forms of capacity (both demand and supply side), in 
return for such capacity being available when the system is tight” (DECC, 2013). While this 
policy specifically includes DSR and storage as a measure for meeting the mechanism’s 
aims, it has been criticised for restricting participation, arbitrarily limiting contract lengths 
and offering only uncertainty about storage capacity during transitional arrangements 
(Yeo, 2014). The Capacity Market only offers one-year storage contracts compared with 
the up to 15-year terms available for fossil fuel generator contracts. The problem with 
supporting flexibility through the Capacity Market is that the latter was originally intended 
for security of supply and, where auctions award long-term contracts, to help de-risk 
power station construction. Balancing the electricity system depends on two conditions: 
capacity adequacy, i.e. enough power generating capacity to meet demand; and 
flexibility, i.e. the system’s responsiveness to changing conditions. In the past, capacity 
adequacy has been the dominant concern of policymakers and the Transmission System 
Operator. However, the structural shift to renewables is making flexibility a priority. 
Following the ruling by the European Court of Justice, the Capacity Market is currently 
in a ’standstill period’. The last auction for delivery in winter 2019 cleared at £6 per kW. 
This very low price reflects the high level of capacity, 10.7 GW, bidding for a target of 4.9 
GW, although around 5.8 GW was awarded. The Capacity Market standstill provides an 
opportunity to think collectively about its rules. Is a Capacity Market really needed? If a 
Capacity Market needs to be in place, we suggest that different rules in terms of size, 
duration and notice periods should be considered in order to ensure participation of 
flexibility assets (Grunewald & Torriti, 2013).
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Demand turn-up should not be isolated – it will become a vital part of the system 
affecting	wholesale	prices
The CGS defines the need for flexible capacity (6.9 GW) as the need to meet peak 
demand (4.9 GW in addition to current peak demand). This mainly relates to peaks in 
winter evenings, which traditionally are associated with the lowest margins between 
supply and demand. However, in a low carbon future, flexibility will need to be integral 
to the system, not only a small resource to be drawn upon in an emergency as an aid to 
capacity adequacy. For instance, electricity wholesale markets in Germany and GB have, 
on several recent occasions, moved into negative prices, which is to say that buyers are 
paid to use power by sellers. Examples of sunny and windy Sundays in which demand is 
low and renewable generation is high abound and will increase the need for increasing 
demand (‘turn-up’) (Torriti, 2016). Some examples of questions currently unaddressed in 
the CGS include the following: are there monetary benefits for consumers in relation to 
demand turn-up; will these be seized be specific categories of consumers? In research, 
as well as in policy, there needs to be greater clarity over the role of demand turn-up.
The	CGS	does	not	address	how	much	flexibility	will	come	from	implicit	DSR
Over the past couple of decades, flexible electricity demand, in the form of turn-down 
and load-shedding has predominantly taken place through the participation of industrial 
and large commercial users14. Whilst there are studies which suggest that much more 
flexibility is technically and economically available from industry, ambitious targets will 
need to consider various forms of flexibility from different types of consumers. Moreover, 
‘implicit’ demand response, in the form of time of use (ToU) and other time-dependent 
tariffs is generally seen as a way to increase flexibility in residential use. The CGS is 
not explicit about the levels of flexibility to be derived from the residential sector. This 
may be due to uncertainties about the social and political acceptability of a system in 
which tariffs are no longer flat. The timing of electricity use by individual households is 
currently estimated using average ‘profiles’. The introduction of smart meters provides an 
opportunity to collect more detailed data and use this to allocate electricity to suppliers 
based on a customer’s actual demand in each half-hour. Whilst moving away from 
profiling to half hourly metering does not imply that there will have to be variable tariffs, 
some of the main benefits of smart meters (e.g. reducing the need for new generation 
and network capacity) are supposed to be associated with the introduction of variable 
tariffs. The impact of more cost-reflective pricing will vary between consumers and this 
will need to be better understood.
Areas	in	which	different	and/or	additional	policies	and	measures	will	be	required
We recommend that BEIS should create a common policy for DSR in order to maximise 
the flexibility potential of electricity demand. DSR to date has been mainly an operational 
decision in the hands of National Grid, relying mostly on the flexibility of industrial and 
commercial end-users. National Grid is currently revisiting the services in which DSR 
operates. However, the next step, possibly in the next two years is for BEIS to introduce 
a common GB policy, which would encourage uptake from residential end-users with 
significant implications for grid balancing and cost reduction. 
14 This has been explained as a reflection of interruptible programmes and aggregators having higher 
incentives for higher capacity in Torriti et al, 2010.
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The policy should improve the current rules of the game of DSR (as highlighted in Box 1) 
as they significantly prevent participation from smaller energy users and leads to limited 
participation of load turn-down which requires more than 10 minutes’ notice  
(see Figure 14).
Figure 14: Distribution of STOR contracted loads by response time. Source: National Grid (2017). STOR 
Market Information Report.
1. We recommend that consumers should be enabled to benefit from the reform of 
the pricing settlement. Ofgem’s recent decision to move to half-hourly settlement 
enables suppliers to know how much their customers consume every half hour. 
Hence, suppliers could offer tariffs based on dynamic pricing, such as ToU tariffs, 
which have the potential to shift demand away from times when demand is higher. 
A reduction in the amount of consumption at peak times should reduce the need for 
investment in new generation and network capacity and hence bill payer cost. 
2. We recommend that the National Grid Capacity Market should aim to increase 
storage and DSR participation, extending the one-year contracts under transitional 
arrangements for a longer time period. This will decrease investors’ uncertainty and 
boost the uptake of storage technologies. BEIS should consider contract duration as 
part of their review of Capacity Market rules. BEIS should review Capacity Market rules 
also in terms of the balance between capital expenditure (Capex) and operational 
expenditure (Opex). The current low Capex and high Opex system means that capacity 
payments are more certain than market revenue, investors are incentivised to build 
diesel and gas engines, at the expense of low carbon and more efficient gas solutions.
3. We recommend reform of the current system of double charging for storage. To 
avoid this, the Ofgem Access Framework should be modified to develop clearer 
definitions of capacity rights as distinct from connection capacity. In practice, changes 
to the Electricity Act 1989 will need to include the definition of storage as a subset of 
generation asset class and not as end consumers of energy.
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Research gaps 
This brief review of the CGS points to three main areas in which further research is 
needed. 
First, any transition brings about change that could potentially disrupt the more 
vulnerable and strengthen those who have capital means. If the transition to a low 
or zero carbon economy is to be equitable, there will be a need for research on how 
vulnerable consumers will be impacted. An example comes from ToU tariffs, which 
in principle offer significant potential benefits to the system by enabling responsive 
electricity demand and reducing peaks. However, the impact of more cost-reflective 
pricing will vary between consumers. In particular, those who consume electricity 
at more expensive peak periods, and who are unable to change their consumption 
patterns, could end up paying significantly more. Understanding the distributional 
effects of ToU tariffs becomes vital to ensuring affordability of energy bills, while making 
demand more flexible. Research will shed light not only on average responses to 
changes in prices, but also on how people’s flexibility varies based on the time of the 
day, location, work and social commitments. 
Second, the CGS views technologies as (the only) enablers of higher flexibility. 
Attempting to engineer solutions may not lead to the desired effects of higher flexibility 
unless there is a deep understanding of how everyday life changes along with the new 
technologies. If such solutions and interventions are only developed to meet current 
‘need’ and their business case assumes this ‘need’ is fixed, then the risk of developing 
rapidly obsolete and uneconomic interventions is high. Research can help understand 
the trajectories of change that must be considered and thus inform adaptive intervention 
design. Research is needed to understand, for instance, how electric vehicles and 
home battery storage might shape, and be shaped by, patterns of demand in people’s 
everyday lives. 
Third, the CGS views flexibility as originating from DSR, storage, clean generation and 
fossil fuel generation. However, flexibility could be derived from a variety of actions 
and changes, some of which may originate from the non-energy sphere. The impact 
of electric vehicles is an obvious example of new possibilities for flexibility which has 
only gained currency in recent years. The decarbonisation of heat could provide fuel 
switching and other opportunities for flexibility. Similarly, flexibility could be the result of 
non-energy changes in society and technology. Research which breaks the boundaries 
of sectors could shed light on opportunities for flexibility beyond existing options. For 
instance, in the future flexible work arrangements and an increase in work from home 
might have implications for when and where energy is consumed and the types of 
flexibilities available at different scales.  
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6. Using zero carbon energy
Nick Eyre (University of Oxford)
Introduction
Earlier chapters of this report set out the scope for reducing energy demand through 
deployment of improved efficiency and changes to energy-using practices. These are 
very significant and, in many cases, likely to be cost effective in a zero carbon economy. 
However, even with significant improvements in efficiency and reductions in demand, 
the fuels used throughout the economy will need to be decarbonised. This has obvious 
implications for the energy supply system, but it will also require major changes in the 
way that energy is used. 
This chapter sets out the issues involved in moving towards the use of decarbonised 
fuels. Using a demand-side perspective allows the incorporation of important questions 
such as ‘How much energy do we need?’, ‘What are the alternatives for providing a 
similar service?’ and ‘How socially acceptable are they?’ into the analysis.
To date, the main focus of the transition to zero carbon fuels has been on electrification. 
Decarbonisation of energy services that are difficult to electrify remains less well-
addressed. This is now widely accepted as the major challenge for decarbonisation of 
energy. It is clearly a challenge for new forms of energy supply to scale up to replace 
petroleum and natural gas. However, there are also huge implications for energy users. 
In most cases, switching from high carbon to zero carbon fuels cannot be achieved 
without changes in technology and practices at the point of energy use.
Current UK policy set out in the Clean Growth Strategy (CGS) reflects some of these 
issues and the potential role of fuels other than electricity, particularly in its hydrogen 
pathway in the sections on “transforming manufacturing and heavy industry” (page 
68), “the future of heat decarbonisation” (page 82) and “lower carbon (transport) fuels” 
(page 91). In each case, some relevant innovation challenges are identified. However, 
the demand-side challenges associated with use of zero carbon fuels are not fully 
addressed.
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Electrification of demand and its limits
Electricity has proven to be the easiest energy vector to decarbonise. There are multiple 
low and zero carbon options. There has been huge progress in reducing the cost of solar 
and wind technologies; these are now broadly competitive with conventional generation 
under UK climate conditions, and further price reductions are likely.
The potential role of increased electrification in decarbonisation has been known for 
many years in buildings (Johnston et al, 2005), transport (Romm, 2006), and more broadly 
(Edmonds et al, 2006). However, only more recently have mainstream studies projected 
electricity to become the dominant energy vector, both in the UK (CCC, 2008; BEIS, 2017) 
and internationally (IEA, 2015; IPCC, 2014; Sugiyama, 2012).
The extent to which electrification will increase total demand for electricity will depend 
on the balance between demand reduction and electrification (Eyre, 2011). Assumptions 
about demand reduction opportunities, in particular, have led to very different official 
projections for electricity demand growth, for example much lower in Germany (BMWi, 
2015) than in the UK (DECC, 2011). Many models designed to address global climate 
issues are insufficiently detailed to address energy demand questions reliably (Lucon 
et al, 2014). Only recently have global analyses emerged that allow for known demand 
reduction opportunities (e.g. Grübler et al, 2018), showing the important potential of 
demand-side change for climate mitigation.
Greater levels of electricity demand flexibility will be needed in a system with increasing 
levels of variable and inflexible generation (see Chapter 5). However, this is far from the 
only constraint on electrification. There are several energy services for which use of 
electricity as a replacement for other fuels is problematic. These are discussed below.
• Industrial processes. These are highly diverse, but many rely on fossil fuels for reasons 
other than their energy content. These include the roles of high temperature flames 
in heat transfer, and the chemical properties of fuels, for example as a chemical 
reducing agent or a feedstock.
• Freight transport, shipping and aviation. Whilst electric vehicles (EVs) are now widely 
expected to become the low carbon choice for light vehicles, electricity storage for 
electrification of road freight, shipping and air transport is more problematic, because 
of the weight and volume of batteries required.
• Space heating in buildings. The scale and seasonality of space heating demand imply 
that complete electrification would require very large investments in either or both 
of peaking generation and inter-seasonal energy storage. Both are likely to remain 
expensive, making complete electrification an unpromising strategy.
Low carbon vectors other than electricity are required to address user issues in these 
sectors, but also to replace the long-term energy storage provided by fossil fuels.
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Alternatives to electrification
The most commonly considered non-fossil alternative in these applications is biomass. 
There is a very active debate about its role in global decarbonisation driven by concerns 
about its availability, its potential to compete with food crops, biodiversity impacts 
and the sustainability of the natural carbon cycle. In the UK, constraints are amplified 
because of the high population density: the practical resource is only ~10% of current UK 
energy use (Slade et al, 2010; CCC, 2018a). Whilst importing biomass is possible, it seems 
unlikely to be a secure option for the UK in the context of global demand for low carbon 
fuels. Moreover, in terms of climate mitigation, these limited supplies of biomass are 
better used for sequestering carbon than for combustion without carbon capture (CCC, 
2018a).
More recently, attention has focused on hydrogen (BEIS, 2017; CCC, 2018b). Whilst the 
investment costs of a transition to hydrogen would be very large, there seems little 
doubt that it is technically possible to convert gas distribution grids to hydrogen (Sadler 
et al. 2016). This would offer significant benefits in avoiding stranded assets in the gas 
sector. The Clean Growth Strategy assumes that the preferred route to hydrogen 
production will be steam methane reforming of natural gas with carbon capture and 
storage (CCS). Analysis indicates it is likely to be the cheapest option (CCC, 2018b). 
However, CCS is not well-established at a commercial scale, so costs are uncertain. 
Other options exist (RS, 2018). The most promising is electrolysis, as lower costs and 
rising output from variable renewables will increasingly make cheaper electricity 
available for large parts of the year (Philibert, 2017). 
There are other hydrogenous gases and liquids which are potentially easier to store and 
transport. There is increasing attention to ammonia produced from renewables, as an 
industrial feedstock, a fuel for shipping and an energy storage medium. Carbonaceous 
liquid fuels, synthesised from hydrogen and carbon dioxide, can be carbon neutral and 
have obvious attractions in transport. However, feedstocks and/or conversion processes 
would have to change for costs to be competitive with other low carbon options.
A demand-side approach
Perspectives that focus solely on decarbonising energy supply imply that there will 
be wholesale change to the energy supply system, but no significant change to the 
structure of demand. This is contrary to the experience of previous energy transitions. 
The development of coal supply and steam power is synonymous with the industrial 
revolution, in which human economic and social activities were transformed. Similar 
effects can be expected in the low carbon transition. Supply technologies will coevolve 
with the activities and technologies that use energy. Buildings, transport and industry, 
and their energy uses, are all likely to be very different after a zero carbon energy 
transition. We therefore recommend that analysis of fuel decarbonisation includes 
assessment of the implications for energy use and the potential for alternative 
approaches to providing energy services.
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Demand-side approach – industrial processes
Chapter 3 of this report sets out the opportunities for reducing energy demand in 
industry by improving process efficiency and reducing the demand for new materials. 
Decarbonisation of fuels will also be required. It is difficult to make generic statements 
about energy use in industry, given the wide range of processes used. Electricity is 
already dominant in some sectors, notably aluminium and chlorine manufacturing, 
as well as important sub-sectors such as secondary steel-making. Some additional 
electrification is possible, for example in relatively low temperature processes such 
as drying, where heat pumps can provide a more efficient option than fossil fuel 
technologies.
Similar easy wins are not available in many high temperature process sectors, such as 
primary steel and cement, and therefore more radical decarbonisation options need to 
be explored. There is a growing literature (Philibert, 2017; BZE, 2017; ETC, 2018a; ETC 
2018b; CCC, 2019), which explore options that go beyond the UK Government’s road 
maps (BEIS, 2015) and the related actions plans that were published alongside the 
Clean Growth Strategy (BEIS, 2017b). These have some common elements, including 
a short-term focus on energy efficiency, with future decarbonisation based on some 
combination of CCS, hydrogen and biomass.
The longer-term options will require policy intervention to support innovation and to 
displace the incumbent, fossil fuel intensive processes. There are welcome signs of 
innovation support under the Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund. However, the road 
maps and action plans developed in collaboration with industrial stakeholders are too 
restricted. Their focus is on decarbonising existing processes, with insufficient attention 
to fundamental changes in demand. This is most obvious in the documents addressing 
the oil refining sector. These assume a significant continuing role for petroleum products 
in transport in 2050, which we judge incompatible with global and UK Government 
energy system decarbonisation goals.
Decarbonisation of production will raise the costs of key materials. These and other 
changes will change the demand for those materials. Decarbonisation analyses need to 
include potential new processes and materials with lower energy and carbon intensities. 
The Government roadmaps include on-site material efficiency options, but exclude 
demand-side resource efficiency. We believe this is a significant omission. Industrial 
process energy use is a prime example of where we need to think about ‘what energy is 
for’, and whether the services provided by the materials and products can be delivered 
in different, and more sustainable ways. For example, the process and manufacturing 
emissions involved in making cement can be reduced upstream – by more efficient 
processes, different fuels and CCS – but also downstream by recycling, new materials 
and new construction techniques. We recommend that the analyses underpinning the 
UK industrial roadmaps is extended to include material efficiency options. Existing 
analysis (see Chapter 3) and future research by CREDS can feed into this.
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Demand-side approach – freight transport, shipping and aviation
Chapter 4 of this report sets out the opportunities for changing energy demand through 
changed patterns of mobility and new passenger road transport technology. Light 
goods vehicles in urban areas offer some early opportunities for electrification due 
to the potential for dedicated recharging facilities. Heavy road freight, shipping and 
aviation are not so amenable to electrification and will require different approaches to 
decarbonisation.
Electrification of long-distance road freight using batteries has weight and volume 
penalties. The most widely-considered alternative is hydrogen-powered vehicles, using 
either internal combustion engines or fuel cells. This raises the issues about large-scale 
production of hydrogen that are discussed above. However, the filling stations used for 
liquid transport fuels may be an easier early market for electrolytic hydrogen than gas 
grid decarbonisation.
Battery operated ships and planes appear technically feasible over short ranges, but 
these transport modes are principally used for long-range transport. There is interest 
within the shipping and aviation sectors in use of biofuels. However, the underpinning 
assumption that long-range transport is the best use of limited bioenergy resources 
is not supported by current evidence (CCC, 2018a). Moreover, at the altitudes used 
for most long-distance aviation, any combustion releases emissions that contribute to 
climate change. 
We welcome the commitments in the Clean Growth Strategy to supporting 
technological innovation for advanced fuels and improved efficiency in road freight, 
aviation and shipping. These will undoubtedly be necessary to achieve energy policy 
goals. However, the analysis assumes the continuation of existing trends of growth in 
long-distance freight transport, driven by increased consumption and trade. As Chapter 
4 of this report indicates, demand growth is not inevitable and projections need to be 
subject to critical review. 
Demand-side approach – space and water heating
Chapter 2 of this report sets out the importance of, and scope for, improving the energy 
performance of UK buildings, in particular by using better insulation and ventilation. 
It is theoretically possible to reduce the energy demand for space heating to zero. 
However, this is not practically possible, even with Passivhaus new-build construction, 
and is inconceivable for the whole UK building stock over the few decades within which 
the transition to a zero carbon economy has to be achieved. Energy demand reduction 
for water heating is more difficult to deal with. Decarbonisation of the fuels used for 
providing heat in buildings is therefore unavoidable if carbon targets are to be met.
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The Clean Growth Strategy recognizes that decarbonisation of heating is a major and 
long-term challenge. More recently, Government has published the evidence base on 
heat decarbonisation (BEIS, 2018). Both reports cover energy sources (e.g. renewable 
electricity, bioenergy), energy vectors (e.g. electricity, mains gas) and conversion devices 
(e.g. boilers, heat pumps), but do not always distinguish their roles clearly. 
It seems likely that the dominant energy vectors for heating will be electricity, mains 
gas and district heating (DH). None of these is a priori low carbon, but all can support 
low carbon sources and their use. Conversion devices at the point of end use will be 
important. They have to be affordable and socially acceptable if they are to be adopted. 
Their efficiency has a major impact on overall system efficiency, and therefore the 
scale and cost of the whole energy system. A critical constraint is the ability to deal 
with periods of system stress, which are likely to remain associated with high winter 
demand. There will be a requirement for the energy system to store energy, including 
over periods much longer than a day. In developing plans for decarbonisation of heat, 
a whole system analysis is needed of heat options, including the performance of 
energy conversion devices and energy storage. We recommend that greater attention 
is given to energy conversion devices and energy storage in the analysis of heat 
decarbonisation.
There is broad agreement that significant electrification of building heating is very likely 
to be required for complete decarbonisation. Heat pumps, rather than electric resistance 
heating, are the efficient means with which this could be delivered. However, heat pumps 
are not simple replacements for fossil fuel boilers; their effectiveness in retrofit depends 
on being able to operate heating systems at lower than conventional temperatures. This 
in turn requires some combination of reduced heat loss, larger radiators, or a shift to 
continuous heating. Deployment of heat pumps, particularly in retrofit, requires careful 
design and sizing, and skilled installation (RAPID-HPC, 2017). Expanding the supply 
chain will take time and is unlikely to happen without Government intervention. We 
recommend that financial support for heat pump heating systems be continued and 
that more policy attention be given to the building heating supply chain.
Some early scenarios with high heat pump adoption (e.g. DECC, 2013) overlooked the 
multiple challenges delivering a systemic change in building heating. In particular, the 
impact on peak electricity demand of very high levels of electrification is unlikely to be 
acceptable, and therefore a more diverse mix of energy carriers will be needed (Eyre 
and Baruah, 2015). 
Exemplars of high DH use that are often cited (notably Denmark and Sweden) have 
been based on an evolving mix of energy sources (Danish Energy Agency, 2017; Werner, 
2017). The advantages of DH are its flexibility with respect to sources of heat, its ability 
to support significant economies of scale in heat conversion and thermal storage, and 
the fact that it removes technical complexity from dwellings. The UK Government is 
supporting the expansion of heat networks through the Heat Network Development Unit. 
These networks require regulation, which has been slow to materialise in the UK, but 
which is now under consideration (BEIS, 2018b). 
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However, for DH to play a significant part in the decarbonisation of heat a number of 
additional measures are needed, including development of the supply chain, reduction 
of perceived risk and thus financing costs, linking to the availability of low carbon heat 
sources, and development of models for the effective integration of heat, electricity 
and gas networks. We recommend BEIS develops a comprehensive strategy for heat, 
including heat networks, but also other options.
More recently, there has been attention to decarbonising gas, through some 
combination of biogas and hydrogen. As set out above, there is an ongoing debate about 
the relative merits of steam methane reforming with CCS and electrolysis for hydrogen 
production. However, end-use perspectives are equally important. A major proposed 
benefit of hydrogen is enabling households to retain existing end-use technologies. 
However, whilst the ability to use existing household appliances has obvious short-term 
merit, transition to higher levels of hydrogen will almost certainly require new end-user 
equipment. Much UK analysis (e.g. BEIS 2018; CCC, 2018b; CCC, 2019) has focused on 
the option of using hydrogen (or biogas) in hybrid heat pumps, in order to avoid meeting 
peak heat demand solely with electricity. This implies a long-term commitment to 
burning zero-carbon gas in a boiler, which is a sub-optimal use of a high cost vector. It 
will be important to explore more efficient options, including combined heat and power 
and gas-fired heat pumps. Analysis of hydrogen as a heating fuel cannot be separated 
from its potential value in providing inter-seasonal energy storage. We recommend 
that ongoing analysis of hydrogen as a heating fuel by both BEIS and the CCC covers 
questions of end use and storage, as well as production and networks.
Most current analysis (e.g. CCC, 2016) points to early growth in electricity use in areas off 
the gas grid. It accepts that more research and trials are needed to explore the merits of 
different options in other locations. Our key message is that decarbonising heat is very 
different from decarbonising electricity, as it has major implications for energy users. 
Demand for thermal comfort, building fabric performance, heating technology efficiency 
and choice of vector are all likely to be important. And they will be the key determinants 
of the low carbon fuels used.
Implications for policy
In our chapters relating to demand reduction and flexibility, we set out specific short-
term actions for Government, along with some longer-term challenges requiring further 
research. For decarbonisation of end-use fuels, the agenda is less well-developed, 
there are more unknowns, and therefore we place greater emphasis on research. Some 
decisions, notably strategic investment in gas, electricity and heat networks, imply very 
substantial infrastructure costs, and therefore the value of information is potentially high 
in helping to avoid stranded investment and to improve our knowledge of the different 
options for decarbonisation.
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However, this is not an excuse for inaction. Early action is required, not just to deliver 
quick wins, but also to develop learning, skills and supply chains. Basic research 
is still needed, but there are already options in transport, buildings and industry 
where demonstration, trials and deployment are appropriate. These will be some 
of the key technologies of the low carbon transition. Developing a UK industrial 
strength in low carbon technology requires investment in these areas. The UK 
Government announcement in December 2018 of a ‘net-zero carbon cluster’ is a 
welcome development. We recommend that Government develops and maintains 
a comprehensive programme of innovation support for decarbonisation of difficult 
sectors.
In the short to medium term, many of the options set out above are unlikely to be cost 
effective against current technologies. To make this the test of financial support would 
be a strategic mistake. Whether a new option can out-perform the gas boiler, the diesel 
engine or the blast furnace in the high carbon economy is irrelevant in the face of the 
Paris Agreement. The right question is whether a technology or practice has a significant 
chance of forming part of an approach to long-term decarbonisation that is likely to be 
socially acceptable, and, if it does, how to support it on its pathway to widespread use.
Changes to technologies for buildings, vehicles and industrial processes will be 
important. However, as we have emphasised, there is every reason to expect very 
significant changes in user practices and commercial business models, as well as supply 
infrastructure as these sectors decarbonise. We recommend that changing practices 
among end users and throughout supply chains should be more central to the 
decarbonisation innovation agenda.
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change in energy demand
Tina Fawcett (University of Oxford), Janette Webb (University of Edinburgh), Stefanie 
Reiss (University of Oxford), Dave Hawkey (University of Edinburgh) and Peter Mallaburn 
(University College London)
Introduction
Policy to reduce energy demand will be critical in delivering the Clean Growth Strategy 
(CGS), helping to achieve the low carbon energy transition. The UK has been a pioneer in 
low carbon policy, with some influential energy demand policies in addition. The Climate 
Change Act is internationally leading, the GB energy efficiency obligation scheme has 
strongly influenced EU policy, and the London Congestion Charge has inspired similar 
schemes elsewhere. However, more significant change is needed if the UK is going to 
meet the 2050, and intermediate, targets for 80% GHG emissions reduction (CCC, 2018). 
Further, the 80% target will need to be strengthened if the UK is to contribute fairly to the 
Paris Agreement ambition of restricting global temperature rise to 1.5C (Pye et al, 2017). 
This challenge has been addressed by the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), whose 
2019 report advises that the UK should adopt a net-zero carbon target by 2050 (CCC 
2019).
The unprecedented challenge of decarbonising energy means that, while we can and 
should learn from past UK, EU and international policy experience, we are likely to 
need new approaches to the design, types and mixes of policy, institutions and delivery 
mechanisms. We will need to rethink governance and expand the ambition and reach of 
policy. The energy transition will require changes in technologies, practices and choices 
for every household and business, many of which we do not currently know how to 
organise technically, cost-effectively or in a socially acceptable way. To aid this transition, 
CREDS’ ‘policy and governance’ research theme will contribute new ideas, analysis and 
evidence to help characterise and meet the multiple challenges involved.
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This brief review of policy and policy processes within the CGS is based on existing 
research and knowledge. It makes recommendations for change by Government, 
and highlights where CREDS can contribute new knowledge. First, there are detailed 
comments on the policy approach and policy mix within the CGS. Then governance and 
institutional aspects are discussed. Finally, policy innovations to deliver further, faster 
and more flexible change are presented.
Policy approach
First the contents of the CGS are briefly analysed and compared with the policy making 
approach of the Scottish Government Climate Change Plan. Then the policy mix and 
policy types employed within the CGS are discussed. Finally, a case is made for the 
importance of including equity in policy design and delivery. 
From a strategy to a plan
The CGS is a report required under the UK Climate Change Act in which the Government 
has to set out the policies and proposals it considers necessary to keep emissions within 
the legislated carbon budgets. The carbon budgets, therefore, provide an overarching 
constraint on the future envisaged by the CGS. The CGS contains many policies and 
proposals – over 200 by our count. However, many do not have timescales, funding or 
targets attached (for detailed analysis see Appendix 1 or Reiss 2018). There are very few 
policies that impose specific obligations on anyone.
A generous interpretation would be that this lack of detail is a function of the stage of 
policymaking (although the publication had been repeatedly delayed, and came six 
years after the first ‘Carbon Plan’). The CGS points forward to a range of consultations 
and sector-specific plans, which will create openings for more detailed policies, but 
these are yet to emerge. By contrast, the Scottish Government has produced a Climate 
Change Plan (Scottish Government, 2018) which sets out sectoral emissions’ envelopes 
and specific indicators against which progress in policy development and outcomes 
can be judged. The UK Government however has more powers than the Scottish 
Government, including some which affect Scottish emissions; powers over energy 
taxation and regulation, for example, are reserved to the UK Government.
A significant difference between the CGS and the Scottish Climate Change Plan is that 
the UK government does not expect to produce a single Clean Growth Plan against 
which progress is measured. Hence the CGS does not break the overarching carbon 
budget down into budgets for specific sectors. Sector-specific emission levels are 
mentioned, but only to illustrate emissions along “one of several plausible pathways” 
(Appendix 2 or Hawkey 2018). Instead regular reporting is promised, in combination with 
the response to the CCC’s Annual Progress Report. Using a sector-specific approach 
would, however, have the advantage of allowing the UK Government to set differential 
targets for sectors of the economy where climate policy is perceived to threaten 
international competitiveness (energy intensive industries) and sectors where this is not a 
significant issue (particularly buildings and transport).
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Recommendation: Government should work swiftly to turn CGS proposals into 
policies	with	specific	targets,	dates	and	budgets.	This	should	include	setting	
sectoral targets, or envelopes. 
Policy types and policy mixes
The CGS does not specify an approach to policymaking, neither does it explain how it 
will determine the mix of policies needed to meet particular goals, beyond saying it will 
use “all the tools available” (p49). The majority of proposals are related to innovation 
investment, i.e. delivering clean growth through technological breakthroughs; only about 
a quarter of proposals aim to address clean growth through regulatory or fiscal measures 
(Appendix 1 or Reiss, 2018). While innovation is important, adoption of innovative 
products does not generally happen without the support of policy instruments.
The importance of policy mixes in delivering effective energy efficiency improvement 
has long been recognised, given the variety of instruments needed to overcome 
different barriers or to support different technologies at various stages of development 
(Rosenow et al, 2016). For many traded goods – including lighting, electrical appliances, 
motors, vehicles and boilers – an EU-wide market transformation approach has been 
taken, which incorporates standards for testing, minimum efficiency and labelling, and 
product bans, complemented by national information, advice, training and subsidy 
programmes. Policies to encourage fuel switching, or policies to change behaviours, 
practices or management of energy also require a mix of instruments.
Recommendation: In developing its more detailed plans, the Government should 
detail the mix of policies, regulatory and market-based, needed to deliver 
innovations. 
Equity	in	the	energy	transition
Equity and justice need to be integral to the energy transition, for principled and 
pragmatic reasons (Parkhill et al, 2013). Fairness and perceptions of fairness are critical 
to successful policy in the UK; perceived unfairness has undermined many past 
policies, e.g. VAT on fuel, fuel duty escalator, feed-in tariffs. UK policymakers have long-
acknowledged that householder access to energy/energy services and transport/
mobility are unevenly distributed. For household energy use, this has led to considerable 
policy attention on fuel poverty. Policy has not, however, succeeded in ending fuel 
poverty (BEIS, 2018). Energy prices have increased at a higher rate than incomes for 
poorer households, and energy efficiency policies have not reduced energy demand in 
homes sufficiently such that adequate energy services are affordable for all.
More attention is needed on how the costs and benefits of the energy transition are 
going to be distributed between different groups in society and different sorts of 
organisations. This topic is not addressed in detail in the CGS (Appendix 1 or Reiss 2018). 
Recommendation:	More	detailed	equity	and	fairness	analysis/questions	should	
be included in consultations and other documents following up the CGS. 
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Governance
This section considers the governance of policy and the role of actors at different scales 
from individuals to national administrations. It proposes new institutional arrangements 
for delivering policies in the CGS, and finishes with comments on the role of politics in 
policymaking.
Individuals, intermediaries and organisations
Despite its focus on technological innovation, the CGS has limited focus on the users or 
adopters of new technology, and the supply chains and installers which will deliver it. 
Research shows that these groups are critical to the adoption of innovations (Owen et al, 
2017). Future research funding for helping people to ‘stop wasting energy’ is announced 
(CGS, p81); this frames people as the problem, rather than as integral to the low carbon 
transition. A wealth of research – some of it commissioned by Government – shows that 
more sophisticated conceptualisation and engagement with people and organisations as 
decisionmakers, investors and users of energy pays dividends.
The CGS has little to say about micro-businesses and SMEs, although they are 
responsible for 55% business energy use (as noted in the CGS, p61). SMEs have less 
capacity and resources to adapt to change than larger firms, and require distinctive 
forms of policy and financial support (Hampton and Fawcett, 2017). To enable and 
encourage them to contribute to the energy transition, SMEs collectively will require 
additional research and tailored policy attention.
Recommendation:	Government	to	assess	the	effectiveness	and	impacts	of	
policy	design	and	delivery	in	relation	to	specific	groups,	including	householders,	
intermediaries, SMEs and other organisations. 
CREDS contribution: To undertake research focused on people and organisations 
and their centrality to, and many roles in, the energy transition. 
Governance within the UK
There is as yet no strategy for coordinated governance of policy on energy efficiency 
and demand in the different nations and regions of the UK. Regional action is mentioned 
in only one CGS policy proposal, despite the focus on driving regional growth through 
local industrial strategies, highlighted in CGS Chapter 1. Earlier work has however argued 
that more systematic, comprehensive and faster improvements in energy saving could 
be achieved through explicit UK, devolved national and local/regional government 
frameworks for action on low energy buildings and clean energy (Webb et al 2017). 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland currently have different devolved powers relevant 
to energy policy, with Northern Ireland having most autonomy; in Britain energy taxation, 
regulation and licencing is reserved to Westminster. Within this framework, Scotland 
has developed the Energy Efficient Scotland programme, and Wales the Energy 
Efficiency Strategy for Wales, each emphasising coordinated national and regional action. 
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The Scottish Government is also now consulting on a new statutory power for local 
government to develop comprehensive Local Heat and Energy Efficiency Strategies 
(LHEES) and implementation plans. In England, governance arrangements are more 
piecemeal and experimental, including for example recent BEIS funding for six pilots to 
test locally-customised supply structures for private housing retrofit. 
Local government needs guidance if it is to make high quality, locally sensitive 
decisions around energy. Scottish LHEES pilots are testing proposals for development 
and adoption of standard socio-economic assessment metrics for evaluating cost 
effectiveness of different energy saving strategies suited to each locality. In the Smart 
Systems and Heat programme, local energy planning tools have been developed 
to model cost-optimal routes to a low energy, low carbon building stock at locality 
scale, but underlying cost calculations are contingent on multiple future uncertainties, 
and resulting scenarios can be difficult to evaluate for local governments with limited 
technical capacity. More work is needed on development of standards for assessing the 
cost effectiveness of different approaches responsive to local problems and priorities.
Recommendation: UK Government to work with devolved national and regional 
governments to develop clearer frameworks, mandates and metrics to support 
further, faster local authority action to reduce energy demand through local and 
regional energy planning and implementation. 
CREDS contribution: Our research programme will develop knowledge and 
capacity on emerging comparative governance strategies within Britain, with a 
particular focus on energy use in buildings. 
Institutions and approaches for policy delivery
Delivering energy efficiency through policy requires a complex mix of policy instruments 
(Rosenow et al, 2017). Most OECD countries use some form of energy agency to manage 
this complexity. An external agency also adds specialist market and project management 
expertise, which is difficult to provide via a generalist civil service with restrictive 
procurement rules (Mallaburn & Eyre 2014). However, this approach comes with risks, 
particularly around loss of Government control and accountability, which was the main 
reason why public funding was removed from the Carbon Trust and Energy Saving Trust 
in 2012.
A new generation of hybrid energy efficiency programmes is emerging that fuse 
industry-led, voluntary programmes with selective Government intervention (van der 
Heijden, 2017). For example, the National Australian Built Environment Rating System 
(NABERS) is a voluntary initiative, supported by the Government, to measure and 
compare the environmental performance of commercial buildings and tenancies. It 
has been widely adopted, and is considered to have been successful in increasing 
environmental and energy performance (Mallaburn, 2018). The German energy efficiency 
networks apply the same approach to industry (Durand et al, 2018).
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Recommendation: The overnment should evaluate the case for hybrid energy 
efficiency	programmes	run	by	a	new	national	Energy	Agency	or	similar	facility	to	
help deliver the CGS.
CREDS	contribution:	to	review	the	impact	of	hybrid	energy	efficiency	programmes	
and the agencies that run them and to consider how the approach could work in 
the UK. 
The politics of policymaking
Policymaking is not an apolitical process: policies are made by governments with 
particular political priorities and values, and within a wider socio-economic context 
(Appendix 2 or Hawkey, 2018). At certain times there may be ‘policy windows’ for 
ambitious climate change policies, but such windows may also close unpredictably 
(Carter and Jacobs, 2014). Nevertheless, some policies have achieved lasting cross-party 
support, and the UK has shown leadership in establishing carbon reduction as a priority 
shared across the mainstream political landscape. Analysis of 40 years of UK energy 
efficiency policy has shown that energy efficiency can meet different goals and fit with 
different political philosophies (Mallaburn and Eyre, 2014). However, other emerging 
approaches to demand reduction, such as sustainable prosperity in a circular economy 
(Jackson, 2017) or sufficiency (Darby and Fawcett, 2018), are more politically contentious. 
These, too, are legitimate and important subjects of research.
CREDS contribution: to explore the full range of policy solutions, including radical 
options,	and	to	consider	their	robustness	against	different	political	priorities.	
Further, faster and more flexibly
To reduce energy demand further and faster, and to make it more flexible, innovation in 
energy and relevant non-energy policy will be required. A number of changes to current 
policymaking are suggested: joined-up policy, going beyond short-term win-win and 
energy efficiency, and taking the reduction of demand more seriously.
Joined-up policy: Heat decarbonisation as an example
The call for more joined-up policy is not new. However, given the scale of change 
envisaged in the energy transition and the interconnected nature of the changes 
required, a joined-up, systematic approach will be essential. The changing nature of the 
energy system itself is widely acknowledged with, for example, distributed generation, 
increasing renewables and smart meters all opening up new opportunities for policy 
intervention, and requiring new policy frameworks. The relationship between supply 
and demand of energy is different and more joined-up now. It is important that analysis 
by researchers and Government identifies the social/technical/economic systems 
surrounding new flexibility, low energy or low carbon innovations, and that policy builds 
on this.
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Heat decarbonisation, a CGS priority, demonstrates the complexity of change envisaged 
and the need for joined-up policy. Low carbon heating systems, such as low temperature 
heat delivered by heat pumps or low carbon gas (hydrogen/biogas + Carbon Capture 
Use and Storage – CCUS), are currently more expensive, complex and problematic than 
the incumbent technologies. To enable adoption of these technologies, it will be vital to 
reduce the energy used for heating and hot water in buildings (Webb, 2016). Reducing 
energy demand in buildings is the best-understood and lowest risk element of a heat 
decarbonisation strategy. However, this is not acknowledged in the CGS, where the 
focus is on supporting low carbon heating technology through a) supporting measures 
to become more attractive so that homeowners will adopt them; b) investing in long 
term knowledge generation for fuel switching; c) investing £320 million in heat network 
infrastructure to develop a self-sustaining market post-2021 (Heat Networks Investment 
Project, 2018). There is a notable lack of policies to deliver more efficient existing 
buildings, particularly in the non-residential and able-to-pay residential sectors (as 
discussed in Chapter 2). Policy for new buildings is also less strong than it could be. Thus, 
by focusing primarily on the supply of heating systems, and not addressing demand 
for the energy services they supply, the CGS is left without an overarching strategy to 
govern the decarbonisation of space and water heating.
Recommendation: Government needs to join up policy on all aspects of 
decarbonisation of heating, and prioritise policies to ensure high standards of 
efficiency	of	the	new	and	existing	building	stock.	More	generally,	a	joined-up	
systematic	approach	to	policy	is	required.	
Beyond short-term win-win
The CGS expects mitigation actions to be win-win: in the short-term, actions should 
deliver both carbon reductions and economic benefits to their adopters. This is 
constraining. For example, a decarbonised heat system is forecast to lead to cost 
increases (Energy Research Partnership, 2017) which are difficult to reconcile with 
short-term win-win framings. The costs of low carbon options can fall more quickly than 
expected, reducing the economy-wide cost of the energy transition – with solar PV and 
batteries being good examples (CCC, 2109). Policy support prior to these technologies 
being win-win options, both in the UK and abroad, has helped deliver cost reductions. 
Nuclear and off-shore wind generation are not subject to a win-win expectation. Public 
subsidy is considered justified, despite cost increases in the case of nuclear power. 
Government is also prepared to support controversial supply-side options, e.g. fracking 
(not mentioned in the CGS); such support has been lacking when demand-side policies 
become controversial, e.g. in the debate about the impact of ‘green charges’ on energy 
bills in 2013 (Carter and Clements, 2015). 
There are alternatives to a short-term win-win approach. In Scotland, the Government 
announced in 2015 that it would treat energy efficiency as a national infrastructure 
priority. This approach to demand-side policy is leading to a requirement for specific 
policy instruments (Scottish Government, 2017). Another option is the ‘energy efficiency 
first’ approach taken by the European Union, which builds on the principles of integrated 
resource planning. 
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Policy could be framed around energy services, rather than energy itself, as proposed 
under the ETI/Energy Systems Catapult ‘Smart Systems and Heat’ programme (Energy 
Systems Catapult, 2018). This is intended to create incentives for suppliers to invest 
in building fabric retrofit, where this is the more cost effective route to provision of 
contracted service levels. Finally, a multiple benefits approach to developing policy 
would ensure that the full social, environmental and economic effects are taken into 
account. This approach can provide a powerful case for action which appeals to a 
variety of values and priorities (IEA, 2014). Each of these proposals would have different 
implications for policymaking. 
Recommendation:	Government	should	reconsider	the	requirement	for	short-term	
win-win from technologies and energy saving, low carbon options at the earlier 
stages of innovation and adoption. 
CREDS contribution: to build capacity on energy demand policy which is not 
necessarily win-win in the short-term and learn from the emerging approaches 
elsewhere. 
Beyond energy efficiency 
For the UK as a whole, energy efficiency has been, and will continue to be, an important 
route to demand reduction – but this is truer for some sectors than others. For buildings, 
energy efficiency has been key to reducing demand over recent years and offers 
significant scope for further reductions (Chapter 2). For industrial energy use, energy 
efficiency has delivered one-third of the savings due to reducing energy intensity, 
but the remaining efficiency opportunity is limited (Chapter 3). However, for transport, 
internal combustion engine vehicle energy efficiency improvement has been insufficient 
to deliver decreases in energy use, with considerable concern about the mismatch 
between lab test and real world energy efficiency (Brand, 2016; Chapter 4). In addition 
to energy efficiency, demand-side policy must also encompass fuel switching and 
flexibility. Government must also acknowledge its own role in shaping demand.
The current policy approach to fuel switching varies by sector. The CGS has set a date 
for the phase out of fossil-fuelled cars and vans (albeit not as ambitious as called for in 
Chapter 4). Until recently, the same drive to require fuel switching has not been seen in 
the buildings sector. . However, in March 2019, a ‘future homes standard’ was announced 
which will ensure that new UK homes will be built without fossil fuel heating from 
2025 (Hammond, 2019). This is a good start, but covers just a small part of the building 
sector (i.e. not the existing building stock). The electrification of heating and transport 
are both likely to require planned withdrawal of existing fossil fuel supplies and their 
infrastructures – a complex social/technical/economic process which now urgently 
requires policy development.
Government policy contributes to shaping demand for energy, energy services, travel 
and mobility. This is arguably most strongly the case in the transport sector, where nearly 
all infrastructure is publicly funded (Marsden et al, 2018). Decisions to expand airport 
capacity inevitably increase energy use and carbon emissions. 
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However, more indirectly, economic, tax and monetary policies also contribute to 
stimulating and shaping demand. Acknowledging tensions between climate goals and 
economic goals, where these exist, is important. Not all growth can be clean growth.
The CGS does not challenge existing energy-intensive practices, such as long-distance 
air travel, or the growth of new energy uses, e.g. the internet of things, big data storage 
and exchange, or cooling of buildings. It does not consider any substantial policy to 
reduce demand for mobility or the services that energy provides. While such policy 
may be thought contrary to the usual aims of Government, it is important to recognise 
that the Government has already expanded policy into new areas in order to deliver 
energy savings and the multiple benefits these bring. For example, it has introduced 
minimum standards for energy efficiency of (some) existing privately owned homes – an 
intervention previously considered politically impossible. The Government will need to 
find new intervention points if carbon reduction targets are to be met.
Recommendation: Government to develop stronger policy on switching away from 
carbon-intensive fuels. Also to recognise the role of its own policies in stimulating 
and shaping demand, and to consider how these could contribute instead to the 
net-zero transition.
CREDS contribution: By analysing policy across sectors, and taking a whole 
systems view, to develop new evidence and arguments for more rapid change.
Taking demand more seriously
Demand reduction and flexibility will be hugely important in delivering the energy 
transition – but policy still focuses disproportionately on energy supply. For example, 
the CGS dedicates almost three times more investment to the electricity system 
(responsible for 21% of emissions), via power and smart systems investments, than to 
businesses and homes (responsible for 38% of carbon emissions, including the 32% of 
national emissions for heating). This is despite recognising the necessity to decarbonise 
heat and its status as “our most difficult policy and technology challenge to meet our 
carbon targets” (CGS:p75). Given the expected future role of electricity across all sectors, 
this may be the right balance of investment. However, the apparent mismatch does 
require closer attention.
Recommendation: Government to reassess the relative priority given to supply 
and demand policy.
CREDS contribution: Research on reasons for policy asymmetry between energy 
supply and demand
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Conclusions: raising the ambition level
As the CCC concluded, the CGS will not deliver sufficient carbon savings to meet 
Government-legislated targets. This chapter has suggested a number of ways of raising 
ambition within the current framing of policy – by setting more detailed policy targets 
and stronger standards, designing appropriate policy mixes, involving and coordinating 
with multiple actors at different levels of governance, and considering new institutional 
arrangements. There is also the more challenging call to reconsider the limits and 
purpose of policy. Successful policymaking also requires paying attention to equity, and 
to the individuals and organisations who make up (and meet) the demand for energy 
services and mobility.
CREDS aims to conduct research on reductions in demand which go further, faster and 
more flexibly – options beyond ‘business as usual’. This will include investigating demand 
for energy services and mobility, and proposals for reducing these, consistent with 
equity, climate protection and energy policy goals. CREDS will provide recommendations 
and evidence for radical or non-marginal changes in delivering emissions reduction, as 
well as incremental improvements. 
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8. Conclusions
Nick Eyre (University of Oxford)
Why energy demand?
Our analysis shows that changing energy demand is critical to the development of 
future energy systems that are secure, affordable and sustainable. In particular, meeting 
the ambitious climate goals of the Paris Agreement and the UK’s Climate Change Act 
involves a systemic change in the energy sector – for energy demand as well as energy 
supply. 
Supporting energy efficiency is consistent with the central goal of the Government’s 
Industrial Strategy of improving UK productivity. Energy efficiency is not just a ‘nice 
to have’ green add-on to energy policy. It is, by definition, energy productivity. It 
is productive investment, creating employment, supporting competitiveness and 
contributing to an innovative economy. 
The analysis in the previous chapters shows the diversity of measures to change energy 
demand across the sectors in which energy is used. We deliberately use the term 
‘changing energy demand’ to emphasise that the demand-side agenda is now broader 
than its traditional agenda of implementing modest efficiency improvements. It includes 
action on the fundamental drivers of energy demand – the human activities that require 
energy services. It also increasingly involves flexibility; changing when energy is used, 
and decarbonisation; the fuels used. So the energy demand agenda is complex.
Learning from experience
Improving energy efficiency at the point of use remains critically important. Efficiency 
improvement generally supports all three pillars of the energy trilemma (security, 
affordability and emisson reductions). It has the potential to deliver policy goals at a 
lower cost than by relying on supply-side options alone. The International Energy Agency 
(IEA, 2016) now refers to energy efficiency as ‘the first fuel’, that is, the first option to 
consider in developing energy policy. 
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Our evidence supports this approach. Of course, not all conceivable energy efficiency 
investments are sensible or cost effective, but the scale of historical under-investment 
means that there remain major opportunities that have bigger benefits than investments 
in new supply. Reducing demand should be a priority. We therefore recommend 
that the Government adopts the position that policymaking should, as a principle, 
consider energy efficiency improvement and other measures that reduce demand as 
‘the first fuel’.
Drawing on the analysis set out in the previous chapters, we believe that the evidence 
shows that there have been three important factors in driving demand reduction. 
The first important factor is innovation. As recognised in the Clean Growth Strategy, 
this involves more than research and development. It also includes demonstration, 
deployment and adoption processes through to mass deployment. Innovation needs to 
be considered as a systemic process as we set out in Chapter 1. 
Innovation expenditure is currently strongly weighted towards energy supply. Whilst 
Research Council commitments to energy efficiency have increased in recent years, 
support for deployment has fallen. Major subsidies for deployment of some energy 
supply technologies dwarf the sums now allocated to supporting energy demand 
innovation. We recommend that the imbalance is corrected by ensuring that energy 
innovation support gives equal priority to energy supply and energy demand.
The second important factor is the role of energy users. The energy transition cannot 
be delivered without greater engagement of energy users – both in households 
and businesses. Some individuals already play a key role as early adopters of clean 
technology and advocates of lower carbon living. Similarly in the business sector, 
companies for which energy is a strategic priority perform better (Cooremans, 2012). But 
many energy users are disengaged. So the ambition of the Clean Growth Strategy for “a 
shared endeavour between Government, business, civil society and the British people” 
is important. There are decades of programme experience with a variety of users 
(Mallaburn and Eyre, 2014), but the lessons do not feature strongly in the Clean Growth 
Strategy. There is increasing evidence motivation may be driven by benefits other than 
cost and carbon savings. We recommend the Government develops a systematic 
approach to engagement on energy demand across all sectors of the economy as 
part of the next Energy White Paper.
The third factor is the role of public policy, which affects both technological innovation 
and engagement. Incentives, information and regulation all have a role, with a policy mix 
generally providing the most effective approach (Rosenow et al, 2016). Government has a 
central role in helping business and householders capture the value of energy efficiency 
by providing support and advice and where necessary intervening to overcome barriers 
and remove poor performers.
Within such a policy portfolio, clear and well-enforced standards, announced well in 
advance, have an important role, as shown by the effectiveness of efficiency standards 
for key products such as domestic heating boilers. 
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There is uncertainty about future product standards if the UK leaves the EU Single 
Market. We recommend that Government commits to ensuring a continued 
framework of increasingly ambitious product standards, as part of a portfolio of 
policy instruments.
Unfortunately, much UK Government policy has become less ambitious and effective in 
recent years. The scale of policy-driven investment in home energy efficiency has been 
reduced substantially. The Green Deal policy is widely recognised to have failed and has 
not been replaced. There is, in effect, no support policy at all on commercial buildings. 
Energy efficiency advice programmes have been cut and business energy efficiency 
incentives and support weakened. Transport energy use has begun to rise again as fiscal 
measures have weakened and investment has fallen in alternatives to private road travel. 
Developing a vision and framework
A vision for energy demand is missing and is now urgently required. There has been 
a drift in public policy towards assuming that energy demand is solely a consumer 
responsibility. Of course, improvements in energy efficiency result in financial benefits 
for households and businesses, which should be encouraged to invest without financial 
support where possible. However, energy demand change also has important public 
benefits: in improved energy security, better public health and urban environments, 
and major employment opportunities, as well as lower carbon emissions. Research is 
increasingly able to quantify these impacts. We recommend that Government assess 
the scale of public benefits from potential energy demand change. 
Many of the assets requiring energy efficiency investment, notably buildings and mass 
transit infrastructure, have the characteristics of infrastructure. They should receive 
the same focus and support as energy supply infrastructure. We recommend that 
Government departments and the National Infrastructure Commission should 
develop plans to ensure low cost capital is available for infrastructure investments in 
energy demand reduction.
These benefits should be reflected in policy support. The Government accepts the case 
for a stable framework for low carbon energy sources in order to reduce investment 
risk. The case for similar support for energy efficiency is even stronger, as the public 
benefits are at least as big and the non-financial barriers to investment are often larger. 
The higher cost effectiveness of energy efficiency means the public benefits derived 
from public investment tend to be higher. We welcome the fact that the Clean Growth 
Strategy sets ambitious targets. If these are to be achieved, the weakening of policy 
needs to be reversed, through comprehensive policy intervention. We recommend 
that Government develops a long-term framework for incentivising demand-side 
investment in all sectors that at least matches the priority assigned to supply-
side policy. This should cover demand reduction, demand response and fuel 
decarbonisation.
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This would be consistent with the broad approach of the Clean Growth Strategy of 
setting clear long-term visions, within which business and civil society can plan. We 
welcome the commitments to ending the sale of petrol and diesel vehicles. Other areas 
where Government could take a similar lead with the potential for popular support 
include: a shorter timescale for requiring net-zero carbon new-build than 2025; ambitious 
goals for high-performance building renovation; targets for reduced road vehicle use in 
urban centres; and goals for reducing the use of carbon intensive materials. 
Winning the broad argument for change will need to accompany the legal and policy 
framework required to implement it. People are therefore central to any coherent 
programme on energy demand. Long term, systemic change inevitably involves 
the energy practices and services that drive the need for energy. We recognise the 
reluctance of policymakers to be seen to interfere in consumer decision-making, 
and therefore to prefer policies relating to ‘things’ rather than people. But it is a false 
dichotomy. Many policies frame, shape or constrain individual decisions and there is 
ample evidence that consumers want and expect Government to make decisions that 
are in the public interest. They do not want the ‘right’ to have a cold home, a polluted 
environment or throwaway products. The key issue is to ensure that decisions are 
understood in terms of public good and working with the community, rather than as 
arbitrary constraints on individual freedom. It will be important for Government to 
be explicit about this and to build support within civil society. We recommend that 
Government consults on and develops a long-term ‘national conversation’ of citizen 
engagement, addressing both the personal impact of policy measures and wider 
issues.
Developing a transition plan
The Clean Growth Strategy provides a starting point. What is now needed is a Clean 
Growth Implementation Plan. The detail will be important as any plan for energy demand 
has implications for consumer behaviour, business decisions, innovation and governance.
In the buildings sector, energy demand has fallen, but the trend is now weakening, 
as there has been a reduction in ambition for both the energy performance of new 
buildings and the rate of renovation of the existing stock. The latter is the tougher 
challenge, but both need to be addressed. Both housing and non-domestic buildings 
need to be addressed. This will need a range of interventions, including tighter 
standards, better enforcement and incentives. One critical aspect of delivery will be to 
re-skill the workforce to meet the task of delivering buildings that are high performing 
in practice, not just on paper. The longer-term challenge is complete decarbonisation of 
heating in buildings, where options need to be opened and a route map developed.   
In the transport sector, there are many similar challenges in ensuring the continued 
improvement of vehicle efficiency. Again, the progress in practice recently has not 
matched what is claimed by the industry due to poor enforcement. There are clear signs 
of the early stages of light vehicle electrification; this is welcome although it raises new 
challenges for generation and distribution. 
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Freight transport, aviation and shipping remain more difficult. In transport, there is also 
very large potential for reducing demand by changing the patterns of land use and 
by modal shift. This is frequently neglected in discussions about transport and energy 
demand, and this deficiency needs to be addressed.
In industry there remains significant scope for technical efficiency improvement, although 
less so than in other sectors. The potential is least in energy intensive manufacturing 
processes. This points to the need for consideration of two more fundamental issues. 
The first is the role of energy intensive materials and products in modern society – how 
they are used, reused and recycled, and the extent to which they can be substituted. The 
second is the development of different process technologies, using electricity and/or 
other decarbonised vectors to replace fossil fuels. 
In all sectors, there needs to be a focus on performance rather than merely technology. 
There is a long history of both energy management in business and energy advice to the 
general public that shows the scope for performance improvement with any given set of 
technology. New technology will be critical to the transition, but is not a panacea. There 
is a chronic performance gap, between design and use in both vehicle and buildings 
technologies. Better real-time data provides a huge opportunity to help address these, 
both by improving the quality of policy instruments such as labels and standards, and by 
enabling smart technologies to provide real-time support for energy decision-makers.    
Ultimately, to meet the UK’s obligations under the Paris Agreement, it is likely that the 
fuels used in every sector will need to be completely decarbonised. To date, priority has 
largely been given to decarbonising electricity. Decarbonisation has therefore been seen 
as primarily a supply-side issue. However, attention will increasingly need to be paid to 
decarbonising heat and other difficult sectors, whether by electrification or otherwise. 
The practices, preferences and choices of energy users are then critical. Hence the 
importance of a national conversation about what is needed. 
In all sectors, what is needed is more than marginal efficiency improvement. To facilitate 
the transition to a society powered largely by renewables, demand needs to be reduced 
and made more flexible. Flexibility is a newer challenge and is particularly important 
for electricity use. It can be delivered both by enabling energy using practices to be 
more flexible and by using various forms of energy storage. Our judgement is that both 
approaches are likely to be required, and that both need policy support.
It will be tempting for policymakers to focus on the technical innovation required to 
deliver such fundamental change. However, for the reasons set out above, ‘end users’ 
cannot be neglected in considerations of ‘end use’. Policies will need to address people 
as well as technologies. In a sustainable energy system, deep demand reduction, 
flexibility and decarbonisation are likely all to be critically important. This is a newer 
research agenda than modest demand reduction. However, for both demand response 
and fuel switching, there is a substantial amount to be learnt from energy demand 
reduction experience in consumer behaviour, supply chain development and policy 
design. 
96
8. Conclusions
CREDS plans to develop the evidence base and an approach to policy integration. We 
recommend the Government coordinates the development of policies for demand 
reduction, flexibility and decarbonisation in an Energy White Paper.
The energy sector also needs reform. Energy demand and supply can no longer be 
governed separately. The UK led the way in the mid-1990s in ensuring that energy 
regulation required energy suppliers in liberalised markets to deliver energy saving 
programmes. This catalysed similar activity across Europe, but this leadership has now 
been thrown away. The very strong focus of existing policy on wholesale markets in 
energy policy, e.g. in the process of Electricity Market Reform (EMR), is very unhelpful. 
With the growth of distributed generation and the increasing availability of storage, the 
assumption that energy will be sold as an undifferentiated commodity is under threat. 
Self-supply and peer-to-peer trading are increasing and may undermine existing markets. 
A new vision is needed in which energy retail policy does more than control unit prices. 
We welcome the renewed interest in retail market design issues in Ofgem, but a more 
fundamental review is required. We recommend that Government initiate a review of 
the fundamentals of electricity and gas retail markets, and whether their focus on 
commodity sales is fit for purpose in the context of the energy transition electricity.
Throughout this report, the implications of digitalisation for energy demand are apparent. 
These are likely to be mixed, but are also unpredictable and rapidly moving. The obvious 
early impact for energy demand in the UK is from the roll-out of smart meters. The 
initial cost-benefit analysis relied heavily on reducing demand through improved user 
engagement. This relies on meters being installed with this as an objective (Darby, 2010), 
which is an example of the need for better engagement in general. From our analysis, 
smart meters are important, not primarily to achieve modest demand reductions, but to 
enable innovation and make demand flexibility a realistic option. 
Understanding the benefits of action on demand
We welcome the emphasis in the Clean Growth Strategy on the need to consider the 
energy transition in the context of its wider implications for the economy and society. This 
is particularly important when considering the role of the demand side. 
Local studies (BEIS, 2017 page 26) show the extent to which low carbon sectors are 
increasingly important within local economies. There is a range of contributions, but it 
is changes in energy demand that are frequently the source of most benefits. We know 
enough about these multiple benefits of addressing demand to better inform policy. So 
our research will focus on how decision-making might better use this type of analysis, 
including at the local level and through the Commission on Travel Demand.
We can also improve our knowledge. Our research on industrial energy efficiency and on 
digitisation aim to quantify the macroeconomic effects of improved energy productivity. 
Our research on buildings will address the importance of the comfort and health benefits 
that are often neglected. Our work on transport will also consider the health benefits of 
transport technology change, but importantly also the multiple benefits of lower-impact 
travel modes. 
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9. Detailed recommendations 
The complexity of energy demand means there is no ‘silver bullet’ solution or policy: a 
range of policy instruments is required to meet energy policy goals. These involve many 
sectors, institutions and stakeholders, with a range of different timescales for action. We 
list a large number of recommendations in this report, and bring them together in this 
chapter. They can be considered under six broad headings.
1. Prioritise energy demand solutions
Energy demand change can support all the key goals of energy policy – security, 
affordability and sustainability – with more synergies and fewer trade-offs than supply-
side solutions. For this reason, treating demand reduction as ‘the first fuel’ is already the 
policy of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the European Union. Demand-side 
solutions also form a key part of implementing sustainable supply, through using zero 
carbon fuels and enabling greater use of variable renewables. In UK energy policy, 
there has been a tendency to focus on energy supply options. We recommend that 
this is reversed and demand-side solutions are given at least equal weight, and that 
Government should: 
• work swiftly to turn proposals in the Clean Growth Strategy into policies with specific 
targets, dates and budgets, including setting sectoral targets or envelopes (BEIS) 
• reassess the relative priority given to supply and demand policy and adopt the 
principle that energy efficiency improvement and other measures that reduce 
demand are considered as ‘the first fuel’ (BEIS)
• develop a long-term framework for incentivising demand-side investment in all 
sectors that at least matches the priority assigned to supply-side policy. This should 
cover demand reduction, demand response and fuel decarbonisation (BEIS, DfT)
• review the fundamentals of electricity and gas retail markets, and whether their focus 
on commodity sales is fit for purpose in the context of the energy transition (BEIS)
• develop a policy for demand-side response to maximise the flexibility potential of 
electricity demand (BEIS, Ofgem) 
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• reform settlement in electricity markets to enable consumers to benefit from half-
hourly pricing (BEIS, Ofgem) 
• increase storage and demand participation in the Capacity Market by extending the 
duration of contracts (BEIS) 
• reform the current system of double charging for electricity storage (BEIS). 
2. Consider and promote all the benefits of demand-side solutions
UK policy with respect to energy demand tends to focus on the benefits of lower carbon 
emissions and lower bills for energy users, often using the latter as an argument for 
minimal intervention. Reduced demand, improved energy efficiency, greater flexibility 
and decarbonised fuels have a much wider range of benefits, notably for health and 
employment. Addressing energy demand is generally more likely to promote sustainable 
development than increasing energy supply. As importantly, recognising all the benefits 
is more likely to motivate action. We recommend that all the benefits of demand-side 
solutions are considered in developing and promoting policy, and that Government 
should:
• assess the scale of public benefits from potential energy demand change (BEIS)
• improve understanding of how to exploit the value of the multiple benefits of energy 
efficiency in buildings (BEIS)
• institute a new approach to transport prices and taxes to reflect a fuller range of costs 
and benefits (DfT, HMT)
• analyse and consider equity and fairness issues in delivering the Clean Growth 
Strategy (BEIS) 
• assess the effectiveness and impacts of policy design and delivery in relation to 
specific groups, including householders, intermediaries and SMEs (BEIS, DfT, MHCLG, 
devolved governments)
• reconsider the requirement for short-term win-win outcomes from energy saving 
options (BEIS, HMT). 
3. Scale up policies that work
UK energy demand policy has featured numerous policy changes in last decade. 
In some cases, such as Carbon Emissions Reduction Target, the Carbon Reduction 
Commitment and the proposed Zero Carbon Homes standard, policy instruments that 
were well-designed and effective have been modified, or much reduced in scale. This 
has significantly reduced the effectiveness of UK energy policy. We recommend greater 
consistency in demand-side policymaking and, in particular, scaling up policies that have 
been shown to work, and that Government should:
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• use a mix of policies, regulatory and market-based, in developing its more detailed 
plans (BEIS, DfT, Defra, MHCLG, HMT) 
• develop plans to ensure low-cost capital is available for infrastructure investments in 
energy demand reduction (BEIS, National Infrastructure Commission).
• focus policy on the ‘as built’ energy performance of buildings (BEIS, MHCLG, devolved 
governments)
• for household heating, focus on actual rather than modelled heat loss from the 
buildings (BEIS, MHCLG, devolved governments)
• for non-domestic buildings, introduce a performance-based policy framework based 
on successful overseas experience (BEIS, MHCLG, devolved governments).
• introduce measures to deliver rapid, low-cost emission reductions from existing 
technologies and systems, for example using product labels to reflect operational 
boiler efficiency (BEIS)
• continue financial support for heat pump heating systems, giving greater attention to 
the building heating supply chain (BEIS)
• increase the ambition of energy demand and emission reductions goals in industry 
(BEIS) 
• commit to ensuring a continued framework of increasingly ambitious product 
standards, as part of a portfolio of policy instruments (BEIS, DfT)
• adopt policies to lock-in recent changes in reduced travel demand (DfT, devolved 
governments)
• develop a cascading framework of national and local support for car clubs (DfT, 
devolved governments)
• provide systematic support for the very lowest energy modes of transport (DfT, 
devolved governments)
• improve the efficiency of vehicles in use, particularly through increased occupancy 
(DfT)
• regulate to reduce the availability and sales of large cars (DfT).
4. Develop long-term plans for demand-side innovation
There has been a tendency in policymaking to see the demand side as having the 
potential to provide quick wins, but not to have a major role in the transition. Our analysis 
indicates that this is unhelpful. Energy demand reduction, flexibility and decarbonisation 
will need to play a critical role and this should be recognised in energy innovation policy. 
We recommend that Government should develop long-term plans for demand-side 
innovation, including:
• energy innovation support that gives equal priority to energy supply and energy 
demand (BEIS, UKRI)
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• stronger policies on switching away from carbon-intensive fuels (BEIS)
• a comprehensive programme of innovation support for decarbonisation of difficult 
sectors (BEIS)
• restructuring of ultra-low emission vehicle (ULEV) targets to include phasing out 
hybrid cars (DFT)
• regulatory frameworks to steer emergent travel innovations to deliver societal benefit 
and avoid high travel lock-in in the future (DfT)
• industrial energy-use goals that include energy efficiency, fuel switching, process 
decarbonisation, carbon capture use and storage, and reducing the demand for 
materials and products (BEIS, Defra, devolved Governments)
• a comprehensive industrial energy demand policy, providing support and incentives 
for innovation and deployment of new technology and business models, including 
for energy efficiency and material efficiency by final consumers (HMT, BEIS, Defra, 
devolved Governments) 
• extending the analyses underpinning the UK industrial roadmaps to include material 
efficiency options (BEIS, Defra) 
• a long-term policy framework to decarbonise buildings based on successful 
experience overseas and the latest research (BEIS)
• an overall policy framework for the building sector that provides a clear signal of 
Government ambition and intent in the medium and long-term that will deliver the 
buildings element of future carbon budgets (BEIS) 
• credible roadmaps for the deployment of emerging technologies such as heat 
pumps, district heating and solid wall insulation in new and existing buildings (BEIS).
• a comprehensive strategy for heat, including heat networks and other options (BEIS)
• greater attention to energy conversion devices and energy storage in the analysis of 
heat decarbonisation (BEIS)
• analysis of hydrogen as a heating fuel that covers questions of end use and storage, 
as well as production and networks (BEIS, CCC) 
• assessment of the potential for alternative approaches to providing energy services in 
overall decarbonisation (BEIS).
5. Build effective institutions for delivery of demand-side solutions
Energy-using activities are diverse, and therefore the policy agenda set out above 
involves influencing a wide range of stakeholders, including both specialists and 
the general public. Doing this effectively will require a major increase in activity in 
demand-side policy delivery in Government at a range of levels. This will require better 
coordination across departments, more capacity and clearer responsibilities for specialist 
agencies, devolved Governments and local government departments. 
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We recommend that Government should reform the existing delivery structures and 
develop an institutional framework designed for delivering the energy transition. This 
should include:
• the development of policies for demand reduction, flexibility and decarbonisation in 
an Energy White Paper (BEIS)
• evaluation of the case for energy efficiency programmes to be delivered by a new 
Energy Agency
• joined-up policy on all aspects of decarbonisation of heating, prioritising policies 
to ensure high standards of efficiency of the new and existing building stock (BEIS, 
MHCLG, devolved Governments) 
• development of a national, long-term energy performance dataset for buildings (BEIS, 
UKRI) 
• more effective collaboration to maximise the value of research and demonstration 
investments (HMT, BEIS, MHCLG and devolved countries)
• a cross-Government approach to energy, climate, waste and industrial strategy (Defra, 
BEIS, Devolved Governments, HMT) 
• commitment to a leadership position internationally on energy-intensive material 
supply chains (BEIS, Defra, DIT, FCO, DfID) 
• development and sharing of better industrial energy and materials data, working with 
industry and the research community (BEIS, Defra) 
• clearer frameworks, mandates and metrics to support further, faster local authority 
action to reduce energy demand through local and regional energy planning (BEIS, 
MHCLG, devolved Governments) 
• incentivisation of coordinated transport and planning objectives to reduce the need to 
travel (DfT, devolved Governments) 
• a zero-growth objective for traffic or transport energy growth and incentives for local 
authorities to achieve it (DfT, devolved Governments).
6. Involve wider stakeholders to build capacity across society
A transformation in the way that energy is used needs to be led by Government, but 
cannot be delivered by Government alone. There is some good practice on which 
to build, but there needs to be a concerted effort to engage, enthuse and empower 
stakeholders across business and civil society. We recommend that Government should 
develop a strategy for Involving wider stakeholders to build capacity across society. This 
should include: 
• a systematic approach to engagement on energy demand across all sectors of the 
economy as part of the next Energy White Paper (BEIS)
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• a long-term national conversation of citizen engagement, addressing both the 
personal impact of policy measures and wider issues (BEIS, devolved Governments)
• ensuring that the implementation of the Hackitt Review addresses the energy 
efficiency performance gap on the evolution of and compliance with buildings 
standards and in the development of skills, standards, procedures and capacity within 
the building sector (BEIS and MHCLG)
• accepting the need to address questions of lifestyle and behaviour change to deliver 
energy and material efficiency (HMT, BEIS, Defra, devolved Governments) 
• making practices among end users and throughout supply chains more central to the 
decarbonisation innovation agenda (BEIS).
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